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Chapter 1
Theory of “Easy Issues”
“If they say bimetallism is good, but that we can not have it until other nations
help us, we reply that, instead of having a gold standard because England has, we
will restore bimetallism, and then let England have bimetallism because the United
States has it. If they dare to come out into the open field and defend the gold
standard as a good thing, we will fight them to the uttermost. Having behind us
the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial
interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their
demand for a gold standard by saying to them: ‘You shall not press down upon the
brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of
gold’ ” (William Jennings Bryan, 1896).
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1.1 Gold Standard Realignment
In 1896 at the Chicago Convention, William Jennings Bryan delivered the fa-
mous “Cross of Gold” speech in which he descriptively argued why the U.S. should
coin silver as well as gold. Farmers and laborers, the “toilers,” as Bryan called them,
wanted bimetallism so that there would be more currency and they could more eas-
ily pay off their debts. After the Civil War, prices of crops and commodities steadily
declined, whilst gold prices continued to rise (Sundquist 1983, 139). Farmers there-
fore had no money and could not pay their debts to bankers in the East (Bryan
and Bryan 2003, 215-218). This dispute between bankers and the financial industry
in the East, and the “toilers” of the South and West amid a burgeoning financial
crisis set the stage for Bryan’s dramatic convention speech. Bryan’s powerful lan-
guage, comparing the maintenance of the gold standard to the crucifixion of Christ,
demonstrates just how emotional and dominant this issue had become. The debate
over the free coinage of silver led to one of the few major partisan realignments in
American history.
Obviously, though, the coinage of money is an exceptionally complex matter
of economic policy. In this particular case, there were even international considera-
tions. Republicans supported the gold standard unless other countries would move
to bimetallism as well (Bryan and Bryan 2003, 113-114). Yet, people knew that
they were financially struggling. They were able to make sense of this issue because
of their own economic woes. “Farmers did not have to be experts on the quantity
theory of money to understand that the value of money too was governed by the
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law of supply and demand—a greater supply of money would depress its value and
correspondingly raise the price of every good and service” (Sundquist 1983, 140). In
the East, though, they knew “the value of gold did have to be defended at all costs,
for the very reason that it was the monetary standard . . . if people lost confidence in
the value of gold because of any sustained decline, the whole system would collapse”
(Sundquist 1983, 140). Even though this was a very complicated economic issue,
both sides knew their plight. “Under these circumstances, neither side could yield”
(Sundquist 1983, 145).
This issue is very complicated, but yet it became emotional for people and
even those with little education could feel their pocketbooks and understand this
issue. How did something so hard and technical become such a polarizing issue?
How could an economic issue lead to a realignment?1 Based on the theory of “easy”
and “hard” issues posited by Edward Carmines and James Stimson, as well as much
American political behavior research that focuses on the limitations of the American
public, the political consequences of such an issue are surprising. The gold standard
is not an issue that would be considered straight-forward, or inherently one that
people feel in their guts. This technical issue’s profound effect on politics highlights
important gaps in our understanding of public opinion and political behavior, and
the theory of easy and hard issues more specifically.
In the following pages I outline the theory of easy and hard issues, and the
larger question that Carmines and Stimson seek to answer—how do people partici-
1Sundquist (1983) provides a detailed account of the history of this and other electoral realign-
ments in American history, tracing the rise of this issue and its political effects.
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pate in politics given that they are largely unsophisticated about political matters?
This question has been the subject of much attention in the past five decades. When
survey data became available in the 1940’s and 1950’s, they revealed that voters are
largely unknowledgeable about political matters and lack coherent policy attitudes.
This picture of the American public fails to match our normative understanding
of a good citizen. According to classical democratic theory, citizens should be in-
formed voters, but much evidence shows the public does not meet these standards.
I address this paradox of democracy by reviewing the requirements of a “good”
democratic citizen and covering the research findings that Americans fail to meet
these standards.
I then move to the literature which attempts to answer this question. Since
the time of these findings of American inadequacy, much political behavior research
has focused on determining how people make political judgements given this low
level of sophistication. There are a number of different answers provided by the lit-
erature on this question. Political scientists have looked different places for the key
to understanding this phenomenon, including at party identification, heuristics, core
values, group-based attitudes, low information rationality, elite cues, and others. I
will not cover all explanations in great detail here as it would be particularly cum-
bersome. I will only cover a small subset of this literature, paying special attention
to those factors that are relevant to my research.
Following the larger discussion about participating in the absence of sophis-
tication, I turn back to the use of the easy/hard issue distinction in the literature,
providing examples of how it has been applied and ways in which it has been ex-
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panded. This, however, points to a number of holes in the original theory, leading
me to explain how my project will contribute to our understanding of easy issues
narrowly and the public opinion and voting literatures more broadly. I describe the
data and empirical tests I use. In the end, I argue that several domains—specifically,
foreign policy and the economy—are different from other political issues, but that
they are most accurately described as “performance” issues rather than “hard” is-
sues. I also posit a theory of issue easiness that asserts that issues can be both easy
and hard, depending upon the political context in which they exist. The political
context is determined by focusing events and frames from political elites (such as
elected, bureaucratic, and party officials).
1.2 Theory of Easy Issues
Carmines and Stimson argue that there are two types of issues: “easy” issues
and “hard” issues. Some issues are inherently “easy” for people to understand and
to use for political decision making, whereas other issues are intrinsically “hard” and
can only be understood by more sophisticated voters. This is why people seemingly
use issues to vote at some times, but do not use issues at other times.
Hard issue voting is described by Carmines and Stimson in “The Two Faces
of Issue Voting” (1980) as requiring:
“[a] conscious calculation of policy benefits for alternative electoral choices
. . . [it] has its intellectual roots in the Downsian tradition (Downs,
1957). It presumes that issue voting is the final result of a sophisticated
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decision calculus; that it represents a reasoned and thoughtful attempt
by voters to use policy preferences to guide their electoral decision. Citi-
zens, after examining the policy positions represented by the candidates
in a given election, vote for the candidate who is closest to them in some
(probably multiple) issue space (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 78).
This concept is further defined by Carmines and Stimson in Issue Evolution:
Race and the Transformation of American Politics (1989) as the more common of
the two types of issues that requires “contextual knowledge, appreciation of often
subtle differences in policy options, a coherent structure of beliefs about politics,
systematic reasoning to connect means to ends, and interest in and attentiveness to
political life” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 12). This type of issue voting squares
with classical democratic theory’s view of a good citizen, but their descriptions of
hard issues indicate that people, unless they are very politically knowledgeable, will
not be able to use these issues to make political decisions. The content of these issues
is too complex for the average, unsophisticated and uninterested voter (Carmines
and Stimson 1980, 80).
Easy issues are described as those that have “become so ingrained over a long
period [of time] that it structures voters’ ‘gut responses’ to candidates and politi-
cal parties” (78). The “gut responses require no conceptual sophistication” so all
people, regardless of their political awareness, can vote based on these easy issues.
So what makes an issue easy, and what distinguishes easy issues from hard issues,
is that people can use easy issues no matter their level of political sophistication
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(well-informed or less informed), their interest in politics (highly attentive or unin-
terested), or their zeal for voting (active or apathetic) (Carmines and Stimson 1980,
80). Carmines and Stimson also articulate three requirements for an issue to be
“easy”: 1–the issue must be symbolic rather than technical; 2–the issue should be
more likely deal with policy ends than means; 3–and be an issue long on the political
agenda (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80).
Carmines and Stimson do not see easy and hard issues as merely two sides of
the same coin—easy issues are not just simplified versions of hard issues, they are
unique. The “distinction between them is fundamental, that they involve different
decision processes, different prerequisite conditions, different voters, and different
interpretation”(Carmines and Stimson 1980, 78). However, even though they draw
this distinction, it remains unclear exactly what this means. They explain that hard
issues are the domain of more sophisticated voters, but the decision processes and
prerequisite conditions remain amorphous. That they are distinct types of issues
points to something inherent about these issues that makes them easy and distin-
guishes them from others. Yet they also say the issues they use as the prototypical
issues for easy and hard issues could be reversed “if the issues had evolved that way
in the political system and if voters saw them that way. All issues have intrinsically
simple and complex facets; which particular facets predominate at a given time is
an empirical question” (81) (emphasis in original).
Despite this theory’s relative popularity in the discipline, once it is examined
more closely, it becomes apparent that this theory is unclear on several critical
points. An even closer inspection reveals contradictions between it and other highly
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regarded theories that explain how people vote and develop political attitudes given
low levels of sophistication.
1.3 The Puzzle of American Democracy
Carmines and Stimson write in response to what may be the most widely
addressed question in the field of American political behavior—how can Ameri-
cans satisfy the requirements of democratic citizens? In classical democratic theory,
public policy is supposed to be created through extensive, informed debate among
attentive citizens (Walker 1966, Marcus 2002). People should reach political deci-
sions as a result of careful, reasoned thought about the political issues of the day
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). There should be agreement on basic values in the
public, and the public needs to be informed and active to maintain the democracy.
As such, classical democratic theory places several hefty requirements on citizens.
First, the democratic citizen is required to participate in politics, have interest in
politics, and engage in political discussion (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954,
307). Second, citizens are also required to be knowledgeable about politics. A citizen
should know the alternative options being considered and the potential consequences
of each. Citizens should make political decisions on the basis of “principles” which
protect not only their own interests but the interests of the whole public (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 308-09).2
2Schattschneider (1960) argues that citizens are not at fault for their limited knowledge about
politics; it makes sense given the limited benefits of participating. What is wrong with our system
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Yet a multitude of research has shown that the public does not actually be-
have in this way. One of the best-known findings in the field of American political
behavior is that Americans are politically unsophisticated and do not know a lot
about politics (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, Converse 1964, Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996, Lippmann 1922, Luskin 1987, Neuman 1986, Zaller 1992). Citizens
have limited information about the way the US political system works, the impor-
tant issues facing the US, and the elected and appointed officials that are critical
to the functioning of our government (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 65). They
struggle to answer questions covering the basic rules and procedures of politics, the
substance of politics, and the key people in politics. Most people also have little
or no motivation to participate in politics beyond voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and
McPhee 1954). There are so few incentives that it would be irrational for people to
participate in many cases (Downs 1957).
Building on this finding, research has also shown that people do not have real
attitudes on issues. In his seminal work, Converse (1964) shows that many people
do not have an ideology or meaningful attitudes on political topics. He finds that
there is a very small portion of the population who are “ideologues” and the rest
of the populace has little attitude constraint both across different issues and over
time. People do not have any general ideological scheme to hold their varied beliefs
together. This leads Converse to argue for the black-and-white model which states
that there are a small number of citizens with attitudes, and the rest essentially flip
is not the citizens, but classical democratic theory itself.
9
a coin to answer questions, which is why they cannot respond consistently to survey
questions.
Zaller (1992) also finds that people do not have stable political attitudes–they
average across the “top-of-the-head” when making determinations about politics.
They “make it up as they go along” because they do not have solidified, long-lasting
political beliefs.3 In the end, rather than making reasoned political decisions based
on a thorough understanding of alternative policy proposals, Americans are criti-
cized for being ill informed and “too ready to be moved by symbolic (i.e., emotional)
appeals, too disinclined to listen to real policy discussion, too ready to be distracted
by the drama of personality and the politics of slash and burn” (Marcus 2002, 2).
1.4 Participating in the Absence of Sophistication
The finding (and repeated confirmation) that Americans are politically unso-
phisticated has led to an abundance of research on how people participate in politics.
We know that people do not meet the “gold standard” for political knowledge and
participation, so many scholars have looked to other answers for how people make
political judgements. Scholars have sought answers to this puzzle in a variety of
places, including two primary sources: heuristics (or other cost-saving information
3There are competing theories which claim that the non-attitudes we see are really due to
measurement error caused by poor survey instruments rather than a lack of preferences on behalf
of respondents. (Please see Achen (1975), Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2008) for details).
Zaller argues that instead of correcting measurement error these fixes actually correct for people’s
lack of attitudes.
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sources) and aggregate public opinion (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000).
Heuristics are “mental shortcuts that provide reasonable but not thoughtful
decisions” (Marcus 2002, 43). They are “judgemental shortcuts, efficient ways to
organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring rela-
tively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex
problems of choice” (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991, 19). People use a vari-
ety of heuristics as shortcuts. Over the years, scholars have identified a number
of these types of shortcuts that voters use, including political party identification
(Campbell et al. 1960, Downs 1957), making inferences about the candidate’s policy
preferences based on information about their demographics or personal character
(Popkin 1991), or the “likability heuristic” (Brady and Sniderman 1985). The “lik-
ability heuristic” brings in group-based attitudes regarding politics. It argues that
people can use the likability of certain groups to make inferences about their policy
positions (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).
This group-based approach to understanding public opinion focuses on how
voters use feelings toward certain groups to shape their attitudes toward policies
(Gilens 2000, Nelson and Kinder 1996, Kam and Kinder 2007). Voters are most
likely to do this when they are less sophisticated and do not have much information
available. They substitute group affect for policy debate to form their political
attitudes. For example, a person may base his/her attitudes on welfare policy in
response to the groups s/he perceives as the beneficiaries of welfare and how s/he
feels about those groups. Attitudes regarding gay marriage can be determined based
on one’s feelings toward gay men and lesbians. Feelings toward social groups can be
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a means for formulating policy preferences.
Additionally, a person’s core values can also be critical to her vote choices or
policy preferences. Core values “reflect abstract, prescriptive beliefs about humanity,
society, and public affairs” (Goren 2005, 881). Core political values are developed
when people are young, and as such are relatively stable and immune to short-
term political forces. As a result, core values (like equality, limited government,
or moral tolerance) can influence people’s attitudes on specific policies or assist in
determining vote choice even though they are not inherently political. Again, there
is some expectation that this connection can be made regardless of a person’s level
of political sophistication (Goren 2001).
The theoretical strength of these short-cuts is that people can still act “ra-
tionally” even with little information. This “low-information rationality” (Popkin
1991) emphasizes what people do know about politics—the sources of information
that are available to voters as well as their ideas about the way government works
(Popkin 1991, 9-12). In this way, rationality is redefined. Rather than people making
“correct” decisions about politics that are determined based on complete political
knowledge, people make decisions based on heuristics. They make decisions based
on elite or campaign cues, partisan identification, feelings about groups, etc. In the
end, people are able to make “correct” vote decisions even if the process they follow
is not correct from a democratic theory standpoint (Lau and Redlawsk 1997).
Other scholars argue that the shortcomings we attribute to voters are really
due to survey measurement error. There are several forms of this theory. The
first argues survey instruments are ineffective for analyzing what is really going
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on in people’s heads. The questions are ambiguous, they force people to reduce
their political opinions to a small subset of choices, and do not mimic political
decision-making in the real world (Achen 1975). Further research over the last
few years has lent credence to this argument. Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder
(2008) find that the inconsistency in people’s responses are due to poor survey
measurement on individual questions. When multiple questions are considered on
the same general topic (such as moral issues or government intervention in the
economy) stable, structured beliefs are revealed. This stability increases as the
number of survey items increases. Furthermore, once this measurement error is
corrected, the issue attitudes actually have strong predictive power in vote choice
models.
Similarly, other scholars argue there for a competent collective. Rather than
aggregating a bunch of issues for one respondent to reveal their true beliefs, we can
aggregate across people to reveal a general public opinion which can overcome the
shortcomings of individual citizens. Even though we know individuals are unable to
satisfy the requirements of classical democratic theory outlined by political philoso-
phers, we can see that the political system as a whole is able to endure quite capably
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 312). What classical democratic theory has
neglected and “undervalued are certain collective properties that reside in the elec-
torate as a whole” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 312). Although we know
that individual voters have unconstrained attitudes about politics, there is a sense
that the population as a whole can provide meaningful opinions on policies.
More recently, research has expanded upon this notion of aggregate public
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opinion. From this perspective, individual-level opinion may change wildly from
one survey to the next, and although survey instruments are flawed and do not
enable researchers to really get at people’s preferences, as a collective, the public
has opinions (Page and Shapiro 1992, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). The
individual-level measurement errors that plague survey data cancel out when we
consider collective public opinion. When individual answers are aggregated, such as
computing the percentage of people who favor a particular policy, we are left with
a real measure of public opinion that is stable and meaningful because the random
noise from each individual cancels out. Although individuals do not have strongly
fixed preferences, “at any given moment the public as a whole also has real collective
policy preferences” (Page and Shapiro 1992, 15-17). The “macro-political system
produces a more sophisticated and intelligent response than we would expect from
what we know about the individual actors who compose it” (Erikson, MacKuen and
Stimson 2002, 2).
Both of these discussions are critical to building my theory. Heuristics, or
other short-cuts to information about politics, may be at the heart of easy issues. If
issues are not inherently easy, then they must develop easy characteristics through
some means. If the world is full of hard issues, then party identification, elite cues,
or other frames must be used to create easy issues. Even if issues are inherently
easy, core values or group-based appeals must be part of the story. Something must
make these issues inherently easy, and that is likely their relation to apolitical world
views like core values. The measurement error debate relates to my project in three
ways. First, the reason that we interpret some issues as easy and others as hard
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for people may in part be a function of how we ask people the questions. Possibly
the wording of some questions makes them easier than others. Second, elite opinion
leaders can help to produce correct aggregate preferences even while individuals are
unsophisticated on the subject. With the help of cues, the public may be able to
develop opinions even with limited technical knowledge of the issue. Third, some
past research on easy/hard issues has focused on aggregate public opinion rather
than delving into the individual factors which shape how a person comes to see an
issue as easy.
1.5 Normative Preference for Issue Voting
Although these theories demonstrate ways that people can participate in pol-
itics even without a thorough understanding of politics, the idea that the American
public is only sophisticated in the aggregate or through the use of heuristics, still
conflicts with our understanding of good democracy. First, if citizens vote/form at-
titudes based on information that has been synthesized by elites or some cost-saving
devices, they still fall short of the high ideals of democracy. Second theories based
on heuristics or collective rationality still presuppose a base-level of information.
“Suggestions that the negative consequences of low levels of political information
can be offset by an informed elite, collective rationality, or heuristic decision mak-
ing underestimate the importance of political information to these very theories”
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 43-45). These theories do not depend on citizens
that are knowledgeable about specific policy alternatives, but people must know
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which parties favor which policy goals, which groups are associated with specific
policy preferences, etc. In the end, “the information necessary for a citizen to en-
gage in these decision-making shortcuts is precisely the kind that many citizens
lack” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 45). On surveys, people frequently do not
know which party or candidate is associated with a specific policy position, so they
do not have even enough information to accurately use these heuristics and cues.
As Carmines and Stimson remind us, “the study of issue voting is infused
with normative consideration” (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 79). Therefore many
scholars, including Carmines and Stimson, hold out hope for the potential of issue
voting in some form. A large body of research has explored how issue voting might
work. Early on in the study of political behavior, Campbell et al. (1960) studied the
necessary conditions for citizens to issue vote, including the voter must be aware of
the issue, must consider it important, and must associate his/her preference with one
of the parties (Hutchings 2003, 76). V.O. Key later argued for a related criterion—
that candidates must articulate their policy positions in order for people to issue
vote (Key 1966).
Subsequent literature has taken up some of these early-recognized necessary
conditions of issue voting and tried to understand how these criteria fit with em-
pirical accounts of issue voting. Scholars have explored the effect of issue salience
(or being part of an issue public) on issue voting (RePass 1971, Krosnick 1988, Ra-
binowitz, Prothro and Jacoby 1982).4 Scholars have also sought an explanation for
4See Niemi and Bartels (1985) for arguments that issue salience does not matter in determining
vote choice.
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how people match their personal policy preferences with those articulated by the
parties and candidates. This takes the form of the directional vs. proximity voting
debate. Proximity voting argues that people will vote for the candidate whose posi-
tion is closest to theirs (Hinich and Munger 1997, Downs 1957). Directional voting,
on the other hand, is a function of compatibility and intensity of the voter’s and
candidate’s policy preferences (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). The distinction
between these two theories is that for directional voting, it does not matter if the
candidate and voter are closest to one another on a policy, but rather that the can-
didate and voter are on the same side of an issue. Research has also studied what
voters do when they are uncertain about the policy positions of the candidates (Bar-
tels 1986) or when their party is on the opposite side of them on an issue (Carsey
and Layman 2006).
Another vein of the issue voting literature, that is reminiscent of the heuristics
explanations of voting in some ways, is the retrospective (Fiorina 1981) or reward-
punishment theory (Key 1966) of voting. Under this theory, people vote based on
how things have changed since the last election and whether things have gotten
better or worse since that time. Citizens “need not know the precise economic or
foreign policies of the incumbent administration in order to see or feel the results
of those policies” (Fiorina 1981, 5). This is similar to the heuristics literature in
that citizens are not working toward a thorough understanding of policy content;
they are using short-cuts to make vote choices. Instead of using candidate likability,
though, they are using the current status of the world, or the nature of the times,
to make choices.
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Despite criticisms of an uneducated public, evidence persists that people can
issue vote given certain circumstances (an interest in the issue and a supportive po-
litical context) (Hutchings 2003, 87-88). From a number of scholars, we see evidence
that issue voting might be possible. This discussion is important to understanding
easy/hard issues because Carmines and Stimson write of easy issue voting, claiming
that these special issues can allow even the least sophisticated citizens to issue vote.
1.6 Easy Issues: A Persistent Theory
Although the original theory of easy and hard issues was created to deal with
issue voting, it has been expanded to broader political behavior debates about the
stability, constraint, and general quality of Americans’ issue “attitudes.” It has
been used across the board to describe any issues that people seemingly respond to
effortlessly. Much recent scholarship treats it like common wisdom, applying it to a
variety of topics, including: the study of presidential persuasion (Bailey and Wilcox
2003), the way elected officials make decisions (Sigelman and Walkosz 1992), and
to understand public opinion on various issues such as foreign policy (Maggiotto
and Wittkopf 1981), social security, physician-assisted suicide (Joslyn and Haider-
Markel 2002), and nuclear power (Pollock and Vittes 1993). It has also played a
role in the literature on partisan change in the electorate (Bowler and Segura 2006),
as well as the literatures on heuristics (Coan and Zechmeister 2008), single-issue
voting (Conover and Coombs 1982), and framing (Brewer 2002). The easy/hard
distinction has also been applied to an array of other topics that would take pages
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to recount.5 The important thing to notice is the wide range of topics that this
theory has been used to understand, and the range of years and journals in which
these publications occur.
Some borrow heavily from the theory using it as a core component of the main
theoretical development of their argument, while others use it as a way to explain
their findings. Across the various studies, though, the theory is generally applied
uncritically. The wide utilization of the easy/hard issue distinction is probably due
to its intuitive appeal. It also allows scholars wide interpretation of the sources
of easy issues—stemming from either elite frames and the role of parties, or more
general explanations based on core values, affect, or group-based response. This
theory can, and has been, taken to mean a variety of things.
Although its broad scope shows the importance of this theory and makes it
key to understanding many different literatures, it is also problematic. The original
concept of easy/hard issues is vague and really provides two different possible sources
for issue easiness: issue characteristics or elite cues. Carmines and Stimson are not
clear about the source of this easiness. As a result, subsequent scholars have focused
on different pieces of the distinction, leading to conflicting understandings of easy
issues in the literature. Some have conceptualized easy issues as those which are
framed in an easy way. Others have instead focused on the issues which appear to
be inherently easy based on their issue content and the emotional reactions that
they cause.
5See Browne (1983), Hurley and Hill (2003), Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983), Hill and Moreno
(2001)
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Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) propose that instead of easy and hard issues there
are easy and hard arguments. They use this conceptualization of easy and hard
arguments to test the impact of different cues (hard-pro, hard-con, easy-pro, easy-
con) on support for NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and national
health care. They find that the hard arguments are actually the most persuasive
for NAFTA. For health care, both the easy and hard arguments work equally well,
as long as they are con arguments (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997, 114).6
This is similar to the position taken by Leege et al. in The Politics of Cultural
Differences (2002) who argue that the style of politics matters more than the issue
content. They argue that although “moral,” “religious,” or “social” issues are often
credited as being easy issues, there is nothing special about such a subset of issues
that makes them inherently easier for the population to use. They believe that
morality politics “is less a set of issues than a style of argumentation that invokes
fundamental social values and emphasizes group differences” (Leege 2002, 27-28).
The policy content of social issues (abortion, gay marriage, prayer in schools) does
not encapsulate the whole notion of cultural politics. Cultural politics is really the
style of politics that is used.7
6An important criticism of this article is that the hard treatments are much longer than the
easy treatments. Possibly, then, they work better just because the arguments against a particular
policy are made clearer to respondents. There is no way to tell if the effects are due to the content
of the arguments, or simply the length of the arguments.
7They do recognize, however, that “some issues by their very nature seem to tap into funda-
mental social values and lend themselves to a politics of group polarization” (Leege 2002, 29).
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In contrast, another interpretation of “easy” issues in the literature argues
that some issues are inherently easy. Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2002) argue that
“one issue can be characterized as an ‘easy’ issue (physician-assisted suicide), where
opinion is based primarily on emotive beliefs. Social security reform . . . can be
classified as a ‘hard’ issue because of the technical information that often informs
opinion.” They believe that some issues have become associated with the term
“easy” because they seemingly are understood by people at a “gut-level.” Joslyn
and Haider-Markel adopt this concept and use it to test the effect of different frames
on easy and hard issues—whether frames work equally well when an issue is easy as
when it is hard. It is left to reader interpretation, however, why we should assume
that a policy which affects millions of people, that many people have direct, real-life,
personal knowledge of, is hard when an issue that most people will never encounter
and can only think about abstractly, is easy. How can we know that people really
see social security as hard and physician-assisted suicide as easy?8
1.7 Moving Toward a Better Understanding of Is-
sue Types
We are left with a theoretical titan that is broadly applied and interpreted, that
in the end remains silent on many important questions. This theory is amorphous
8This core problem with their analysis may help to explain their findings—“frames on ‘easy’
issues may ironically have more influence on perceived opinion than frames on ‘hard’ issues” (Joslyn
and Haider-Markel 2002, 702).
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and ambiguous. Therefore, my first step is to look for evidence that “easy” issues
exist. Carmines and Stimson only look at two issues (desegregation and the Vietnam
withdraw) during one election (1972). This is an inadequate test for us to conclude
that this concept holds true. In chapter 2 I begin with the original Carmines and
Stimson test (how issues relate to vote choice) but applying it to more issues such as
abortion, affirmative action, immigration, taxes, and Iraq War among others, across
different issue domains. I look at a number of issues over different years looking for
patterns of easy issue voting. Evidence for “easy” issue voting proves to be mixed.
The primary question stemming from the analysis in this chapter is, why would
people vote on “hard” issues if easier ones are available?
In chapter 3, I explore some possible reasons for the counterintuitive findings
with regards to issue voting by looking at item non-response rates and issue salience.
These next tests are not part of Carmines’ and Stimson’s original conceptualization,
but may help to provide more clarity on the concept. Additionally, research since
the writing of their article really render them necessary. I look at the percentage
of respondents who give “don’t know” responses, expecting that if an issue is easy,
more people should be able to give valid responses to questions about it. I find that
commonly considered “easy” issues (like abortion and gay rights) do exhibit lower
levels of item non-response. However, these issues are not salient.
Finding that some issues do appear to be “easier” for the public, but that these
issues almost never decide elections, I turn to potential sources for issue easiness.
I focus on the role of frames as potential sources for easiness as compared to the
notion of inherently easy issues. In chapter 4, I show the results of a survey experi-
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ment. I use non-salient, “hard” issues (limiting foreign imports, U.S. participation
in the ICC, and adoption of the gold standard) and offer two frames—technical
and emotional—to see how they shape public opinion on these issues. I find some
support that frames can make these issues easier for the public, although the results
are mixed.
In chapter 5, I look at the potential of frames designed for the opposite
purpose—using frames that are designed to harden an “easy” issues such as abortion.
Unfortunately, the experiments seem to indicate that abortion cannot be framed as
“hard.” The frames were largely unsuccessful in changing people’s abortion atti-
tudes. I discuss possible reasons the frames do not work. The limited effects of
the frames could be due to the innate characteristics of abortion as an issue, or the
repeated framing of this issue in terms of pro-life and pro-choice by the political
parties over many years. The results are interesting in the sense that they point to
potential limitations on framing. Possibly, once an issue is repeatedly framed in an
emotional, two-sided way, it cannot be made hard again.
My findings lead me argue that a simple dichotomy of “easy” and “hard” issues
is possibly oversimplified. While Carmines and Stimson even say that issues are not
firmly set in stone as either easy or hard, they also do not include a description of
how this process works—how an issue that was hard can become easy or vice-versa
(assuming that it is possible for issues to change back and forth). Certainly, issues
cannot all be neatly placed into this framework when the choice is either they are
easy or they are hard. Where do immigration, the economy, universal healthcare,
the environment, or a dozen other issues that are part of the current American
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politics debate fit into this easy or hard framework? It is impossible to tell. Based
on my findings in the first two chapters, I argue that another important issue type is
“performance” issues. What distinguished foreign policy and economic issues from
those dealing with social welfare, morality, or other issue domains is not necessarily
that they are “hard,” but that they are primarily “performance” issues. My findings
in the second two chapters indicate that framing is important to this theory, but




2.1 “Hard” Issue Voting
Hard issues are technical, deal with policy means, and are new to the political
agenda. Therefore, hard issues are the province of politically knowledgeable, atten-
tive voters. Easy issues, however, can be used by all people to vote, regardless of
their political knowledge. Through the literature, many have come to understand
that the “typical hard issue areas are foreign policy, regulation, and policies relating
to economic growth” (Bailey and Wilcox 2003, 50) while racial, social, or moral
issues are “easy.”
Many scholars consider foreign policy to be a hard issue domain as “the per-
sonal relevance of global events may seem low for many citizens, limiting motivation
to attend to the details of those events” and “because foreign policy is often highly
complex, the citizen’s ability to evaluate specific aspects of foreign policy may be
low” (Mondak 1993, 197-198). Moreover, “the public [is] almost totally dependent
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upon the media and political elites for its interpretations of the state of the inter-
national scene” and “information in foreign affairs is often deliberately distorted,
withheld, or classified” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 243). The use of Vietnam with-
drawal as the foundational example of a hard issue also likely influences the labeling
of foreign policy as a “hard” issue domain.
Similarly, the economy is also often regarded as a “hard” issue because of the
technical nature of the topic. “Economic issues . . . should be harder than racial or
social ones. Economic choices are abstract, even if their consequences are concrete.
They are more technical than symbolic and involve means as much as ends” (Luskin
and Carmines 1989, 444). However, despite the understanding that foreign policy
and economic issues are hard, there are empirical and theoretical reasons to question
the general labeling of these domains as “hard” issues.
2.2 Vietnam Voting in 1972
In “The Two Faces of Issue Voting,” Carmines and Stimson test their the-
ory of “easy” and “hard” issues using the 1972 presidential election. They use
desegregation as their example of an “easy” issue1 and Vietnam troop withdrawal
1They call the easy issue “desegregation,” but it is not actually the single-item measure in the
1972 NES that asks people whether they favor segregation or desegregation. It is a factor score of
15 race-related items, including: equal employment, school integration, public accommodations,
neighborhood integration, school busing, aid for minorities, civil rights moving too fast, violence
of blacks, blacks helped/hurt cause, preference for (de)segregation, preference for (de)segregated
neighborhood, equivalence of intelligence, and feeling thermometers for black militants, urban
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as their example of a “hard” issue. Desegregation was a symbolic issue that had
been on the political agenda for a long time and had therefore found its way to the
gut. Whether U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Vietnam, conversely, was a
relatively new issue to politics and dealt with policy means.
They empirically support this classification by looking at the connection of
each of these issues to presidential vote choice, and how this connection is condi-
tioned based on level of political knowledge. They predict vote choice (McGovern
or Nixon vote) with party identification, attitudes on Vietnam withdrawal, deseg-
regation, government guarantee of jobs, the legalization of marijuana, rights of the
accused, women’s role, tax reform, government control of inflation, and attitudes
toward black activists. They then create two figures—one for Vietnam withdrawal
and one for desegregation—to show the percentage of McGovern vote for each of the
seven levels of attitudes toward the two issues2 by level of political knowledge. They
create 3 levels of political knowledge (low, medium, and high) based on the number
of correct answers respondents gave to factual political knowledge questions.3
rioters, and civil rights leaders.
2The Vietnam withdrawal scale ranges from 1-complete withdrawal to 7-military victory,
with points 2-6 unlabeled in between. The desegregation scale ranges from 1-segregation to 7-
desegregation and is the result of a factor analysis.
3As the explain in footnote 4, the “classification is based upon the number of right answers to
a series of six objective questions about American politics administered to the Form 1 subsample.
The series includes some questions which are current and relevant to electoral decision making (e.g.,
which party controls Congress?) and some which tap background information (e.g., the number of
years in a senatorial term). The requirement of objectively correct answers limits the possibility
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There are two primary findings to note. First, desegregation is “easy” and
Vietnam is “hard” by their measure because respondent use of Vietnam withdrawal
to determine vote choice is conditioned by level of information, whereas people’s
attitudes on desegregation are connected to the vote regardless of their level of po-
litical knowledge. The percentage voting for McGovern when favoring desegregation
is almost identical for all three levels of information. The differences in McGovern
vote even for those favoring segregation is only about 20 percentage points ranging
from 15% for the middle information and 35% for the lowest information groups. For
Vietnam withdrawal, among those who want complete withdrawal, the difference in
McGovern vote is roughly 10 percentage points ranging from 70% among the lowest
sophistication and 80% among the highest. The difference in McGovern vote for
those who want a military victory is even bigger—about 30 percentage points dif-
ferent, ranging from 5% among the highest information and 35% among the lowest.
In the case of Vietnam withdrawal (the hard issue) connection to the vote is con-
ditioned by respondent sophistication. The more highly sophisticated respondents
are able to connect the Vietnam issue with their vote choice in a way that lower
sophisticated respondents are not. In the case of the easy issue (desegregation),
the connection to the vote is the same for all people, regardless of sophistication.
This leads Carmines and Stimson to argue that desegregation is an easy issue and
Vietnam withdrawal hard.
Second, the occurrence of issue voting on the Vietnam withdrawal is higher,
of measuring more directly relevant information. Scores of 0, 1, and 2 are classified ‘low,’ 3 and 4
‘medium,’ and 5 and 6 ‘high’ (82).
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even though it is a “hard” issue. The overall effect of desegregation on voting is
lower than Vietnam, likely because the Vietnam War is more salient in 1972 than
desegregation. I argue that, even if attachment to the vote is conditioned by level
of political knowledge, the overall effect of an issue on vote choice should not be
ignored when evaluating an issue’s easiness. Although on their figures the three
lines for desegregation are clustered together and have the same slope regardless of
high, medium, or low knowledge, the slope is relatively flat. The lines for Vietnam
withdrawal are distinguished by sophistication, with the steepest slope occurring
for the highest sophistication group, and a lesser slope occurring for the lowest
information group. However, the slope for all of the lines for Vietnam withdrawal
are steeper than the lines for desegregation. Again, referring to the percentages
of people voting for McGovern moving across the Vietnam withdrawal scale from
“withdrawal completely” to “military victory,” the change in McGovern vote is 75
percentage points for the highest information group (from roughly 80% for those
who favor complete withdrawal to 5% for people who favor a military victory), 65
percentage points for the medium information group (from around 75% of those
who favor complete withdrawal to 10% of those who favor military victory), and
35 percentage points for the lowest information group (from approximately 70% of
those who want complete withdrawal to 35% of those who want a military victory).
This is far from a 50-50 split when voters cannot connect their issue preference
to the vote. For desegregation, the change in McGovern vote percentages moving
across the scale is considerably less. Going from desegregation to segregation on the
scale, the differences in McGovern voting are 30 percentage points for the highest
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information group, 50 percentage points for the medium information group, and
30 percentage points for the lowest information group.4 Attitudes on desegregation
were less influential than attitudes on Vietnam withdrawal in shaping people’s voting
preferences.
Carmines and Stimson recognize that Vietnam is the most powerful issue at-
titude predictor of vote choice, but emphasize that “what is intriguing about Table
1 is that racial desegregation emerges as the second best ‘issue’ predictor of vote
choice in 1972” even though “racial desegregation was hardly mentioned by either
candidate. That it was not emphasized in party platforms and not salient in the
campaign but still exerted a substantial influence on the election outcome suggests
something about the unusual properties of desegregation as a political issue” (82).
Again, I argue that a truly “hard” issue that is all but unknown to the public should
not be the most powerful predictor (behind party identification) of vote choice. Fur-
thermore, this analysis about racial issues’ lack of salience in 1972 ignores that issue
salience does not wane over night. In the immediately prior presidential election
of 1968, segregation was among the most talked about issues. The election dis-
course focused heavily on racial issues, partly due to third party candidate George
Wallace’s pro-segregation message.
Additionally, if an issue is “hard” we should expect that people do not un-
4For all three sophistication levels, people vote for McGovern around 60-65% if they favor
desegregation. For the lowest sophistication group, around 35% vote McGovern if they favor
segregation. For the middle information group, around 15% vote McGovern, and for the highest
information group approximately 30% vote McGovern.
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derstand the issue sufficiently to know how the candidates or parties come down on
the issue. The details are too technical and far removed from the everyday lives
of people that they have no sense of the political discourse surrounding this issue.
Yet in the case of Vietnam, the overwhelming majority of the sample, roughly 87%,
are able to correctly place McGovern as more supportive of immediate withdrawal
than Nixon.5 This is an especially powerful sign of the public’s awareness on this
issue because the candidates’ stances on Vietnam in 1972 are similar, meaning that
they would have to pay fairly close attention to politics in order to know how the
candidates stand on this issue relative to one another. McGovern’s stance is proba-
bly pretty clear to most voters—he staunchly supported an immediate withdrawal
of U.S. troops from the war pretty much from the beginning of war. At this point
in the war, though, Nixon also supports de-escalation, just on a different time ta-
ble. Neither of the candidates in this election really supports a “complete military
victory”; both argue for a de-escalation of the military effort. While it is clear that
McGovern supports an immediate end to the war, it is less clear that Nixon wants
to continue the war, but most everyone is able to place the candidates correctly.6
Why does Vietnam withdrawal matter more than desegregation for vote choice
in 1972 if Vietnam withdrawal is a “hard” issue? Is this an isolated finding and
5“Correct” placement means that, regardless of the absolute level of a person’s placement of
Nixon or McGovern, as long as McGovern was placed closer to the “immediate withdrawal” end
then Nixon.
6Unfortunately, the NES does not ask respondents to place the candidates on the Iraq or Afghan
wars in 2008, so there is no comparison available for 2008.
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usually what are commonly thought of as “easy” issues matter more for the vote,
or is this pattern consistent for other years as well?
2.3 “Hard” Issue Voting in the 2008 NES
If this is a “hard” issue, we should expect that the issue does not influence
vote choice, at least not for less knowledgeable respondents. However, as I argue
that these foreign policy issues are not “hard,” I hypothesize that voters who favor
a deadline for removing troops from Iraq will be more likely to support Obama as
compared to those who oppose a deadline troop withdrawal, regardless of level of
political knowledge. The connection of war attitudes to the vote will not be condi-
tioned by level of political sophistication, as we would expect if troop withdrawal
was a “hard” issue as presumed. I argue that these issues are not really hard be-
cause foreign policy issues like U.S. involvement in wars are actually “performance”
issues. Since they are performance issues, the public can vote on them regardless of
sophistication because information about the success of the wars is readily available
and there is limited framing that can take place on such issues.
Following the original 1972 test of Carmines and Stimson, I estimated a probit
model to predict vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. I included party iden-
tification and a number of issue attitude controls, including government guaranteed
jobs, government supplied health insurance, laws preventing discrimination against
homosexuals, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, whether the economy has gotten
better or worse, and support for the government bailout of companies. I addition-
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ally included several standard control variables (race, sex, income, ideology, and
region of residence) in the model. I also weighted the results to compensate for an
over-sample of minority respondents on the 2008 NES. The findings are presented
in table 2.1.
As expected, party identification and ideology are both related to vote choice.
Among the issues included in the model, attitudes toward laws preventing discrimi-
nation against gay people, troop withdrawal from Iraq, and retrospective evaluations
of whether the economy is better or worse all were significantly related to vote choice
in 2008. Based on the key issues discussed during the election campaign, it makes
sense that these issue attitudes would be related to presidential vote choice in 2008.
In order to substantively evaluate the effect of each of these issues on vote choice, I
computed predicted probabilities of voting for Obama. The predicted probabilities
are presented in figures 2.1-2.3.
Figure 2.1 shows the change in the probability of voting for Obama when mov-
ing across the full range of attitudes on U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq, based on
level of political knowledge. The first thing to note is that there is no conditioning
effect of political knowledge. The low, medium, and high knowledge people all con-
nect attitudes on troop withdrawal the same. Second, the change in the probability
of voting for Obama is about 8 percentage points from those who favor a great deal
a deadline for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq to those who oppose a withdrawal
deadline a great deal. This is a pretty big effect. However, retrospective evaluations
of the economy have a larger effect. In figure 2.2, the change in the probability of
voting based on retrospective evaluations of the economy and political knowledge
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Government Guaranteed Jobs -0.03
(0.10)
Aid to Blacks -0.07
(0.08)
Government Health Insurance -0.04
(0.08)
























Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: 2008 NES. The coefficient estimates and standard errors are computed using
sample weights provided by the 2008 ANES.
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Figure 2.1: Probability of Voting for Obama by Support for Iraq Troop Withdrawal
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are shown. Again, political knowledge does not matter—low, medium, and high
knowledge people all attach their economic evaluations to the vote in the same way.
The change in the probability of voting for Obama is now 15 percentage points when
moving from thinking the economy has gotten much better to thinking the economy
has gotten much worse.
Figure 2.2: Probability of Voting for Obama by Whether Economy Better or Worse
Finally, figure 2.3 shows the probability of voting for Obama based on atti-
tudes toward laws preventing discrimination against gay people based on political
knowledge. For this issue as well, level of political knowledge is inconsequential to
whether people attach their attitudes on this issue to their vote choice. The effect
of attitudes toward gay discrimination laws is similar to that of attitudes toward a
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troop withdrawal deadline. There is roughly a 12 percentage point change in the
probability of voting for Obama when going from favor strongly laws to prevent gays
from discrimination to oppose strongly laws to prevent gays from discrimination.
Figure 2.3: Probability of Voting for Obama by Attitudes toward Gay Discrimina-
tion Laws
In the case of 2008, the connection of these issues to the vote is not conditioned
by level of political knowledge for any of these issues. This points to all three of
these issues being “easy” by the original test. All three of these issues also exert a
substantive effect on vote choice. Attitudes toward laws to prevent discrimination
against gay people is important to vote choice in 2008, just as attitudes toward an
Iraq troop withdrawal deadline and evaluations of the economy are. Laws regarding
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gay discrimination is expected to be an “easy” issue based on the previous literature,
though, whereas economic evaluations and U.S. troop levels are not. Yet, economic
evaluation are the most important issue predictor of vote choice in 2008.
2.4 Understanding these Findings
Claiming that economic or foreign policy issues are important in determining
election outcomes is not an original argument. The economy is arguably a critical
component of the electoral decision-making process. Politics and economics are so
united in voting behavior that “when you think economics, think elections; when
you think elections, think economics (Tufte 1978, 65). Elections are the embodiment
of economic evaluations of the incumbent president, governor, or any other executive
figure. Fiorina (1981), Kiewiet (1983) and Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) all show
that the American public evaluates presidents based on their economic performance.
Unemployment and inflation rates shape economic evaluations, either retrospectively
or prospectively, and, in turn, penalize or award the incumbent (Lewis-Beck and
Nadeau 2000, Lewis-Beck and Tien 2008). In short, the “voters are not fools (Key
1966, 7), so they will reward a president who creates jobs, stabilizes prices, and
leads the U.S. to economic prosperity.
The claim that the economy is uniquely important in determining election
outcomes is further bolstered by public opinion research that recognizes the economy
as a “valence” issue. There is only one constituency when it comes to the economy—
the constituency for a strong economy.
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“The issues of economic well-being probably come as close as any in
modern politics to being pure ‘valence’ issues . . . If we conceive of eco-
nomic issues in dimensional terms, the electorate is not spread along a
continuum of preference extending between good times and bad; its be-
liefs are overwhelmingly concentrated at the good times end of such a
continuum” (Butler and Stokes 1969, 390).
Furthermore, models forecasting presidential election results have focused heav-
ily on economic and foreign policy issues. This close connection between the econ-
omy and election results has been subject to many electoral forecasting tests. For
example, eight out of nine forecasting models for the 2008 presidential elections used
a variable related to the economy (either objectively or subjectively) to predict the
election outcome (PS: Political Science and Politics, 2008). Recently, a new line of
forecasting research introduced foreign policy performance as another crucial dy-
namic in explaining electoral outcomes. The Bread and Peace Model measures “the
effects on votes for president of per capita real income growth and the cumulative
number of American military fatalities in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq” (Hibbs 2008,
2-3). This forecasting model yielded better predictions for the 2008 presidential
election than some economy-only forecasting models. It is clear that the American
electorate is not as unsophisticated as some theoretical frameworks suggest. They
do not need to know or solidify their positions on specific economic or foreign poli-
cies. However, they are very well aware whether the president is performing well or
not. And, that seems sufficient to make a vote choice.
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Although the importance of the economy and foreign policy in predicting elec-
tion outcomes is well established, little work has been done to explore the con-
tradictory connection between these issues and the theory of “easy” issues. Both
literatures are widely read, cited, and studied, but they point to different expecta-
tions for the American electorate. Why do we see people using “hard” issues to vote
when there are easier issues available?
Theoretically, I argue there are several reasons for these counterintuitive find-
ings. Vote choice is influenced by many things in addition to issues. Voters often
use “information shortcuts” (Popkin 1991) or heuristics to lessen the work required
to vote. Scholars have identified many such shortcuts voters use. Two of the most
important and resilient are party identification and candidate evaluations. Party
identification has been shown to strongly influence voting behavior over and over
again, starting with The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960). Candidate lik-
ability is also important in determining vote choice (Brady and Sniderman 1985).
Throughout recent presidential elections, the media has focused on whether the
presidential candidates are likable and whether citizens “would like to have a beer
with him.” People’s vote choices can be based on many things, but specific policies
are often not the most compelling reason for their vote, despite the hopes of democ-
racy proponents that people will form their attitudes based on well-reasoned policy
decisions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954). These other voting determinants
make it very difficult to establish which part of the vote can be attributed to the
easiness of an issue.
Furthermore, even when people do engage in issue voting, it is a two-step
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process. People must first develop their own opinion on an issue. Then they must
calculate the relationship between their preference and the candidate or party po-
sition (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 82). This understanding of issue voting is not
necessarily explicit in all discussions of issue voting, but it is certainly implicit.7 In
order for people to use issues for voting, they must first form an opinion on the issue.
Only after this initial step can they work to match their preference to those of the
candidates or parties in the election. So looking to voting to determine when issues
are easy for people really skips the first, more basic test for issue easiness—assessing
whether people hold attitudes on those issues. I will discuss this more in the next
chapter.
2.5 Conclusion
When looking again at the 1972 election, we see that overall levels of issue
voting are higher for Vietnam withdrawal than for desegregation. This effect of
“hard” issues like foreign policy and economic issues’ influence on the vote is not
limited to this one election either. The importance of foreign policy and economic
issues in politics is undeniable. I offer several theoretical explanations for this coun-
terintuitive finding, including how issue salience and other factors shape vote choice,
7For example, the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) argues
that there are two steps to issue voting as well. But the first step is determining whether the
person and candidate are on the same side or different side of the issue, then the second step is
determining the intensity of the preference. In both steps, having an attitude to compare to the
candidates’ preferences is implicit. This is true of basically all spatial models of vote preference.
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which I explore more in the next chapter.
Based on much of the public opinion literature that accepts inherently easy
issues, these findings are somewhat surprising. Yet, there is another dialogue among
scholars that does recognize the importance of economic and foreign policy issues in
shaping election outcomes. Viewed in this other light, in some ways, it is surprising
to think of racial issues as easy. They do elicit a gut response from many people,
which fits the Carmines and Stimson description for an easy issue. Yet when public
opinion is deeply divided on an issue, it is anything but easy for politicians. Po-
litically, racial issues have always been very tricky in the U.S. since the founding.
Although the founding fathers could come to many agreements through debate when
writing the Constitution, they were not able to settle the issue of slavery. Knowing
that they would not be able to reconcile their differences with regards to this issue,
they pushed it off. Racial issues and equal rights for people with all skin colors are
fights that nearly tore the country apart, and are battles our country still wages
today. Possibly, it is because these issues are felt in the gut by both sides that
they have been and are so hotly debated, supporting the original description of easy
issues. It does seem strange to me, though, to label “easy” the issue that took 200
years before candidates on both sides of the aisle supported similar positions when it
took 1/20 of that time for candidates on both sides to reach similar positions on the




Looking for Evidence of “Easy”
Issues: Answers and Issue Salience
3.1 What “Don’t Know” Responses May Tell Us
about Easy Issues
Easy issues are ones that become “so ingrained over a long period that it
structures voters’ ‘gut responses’ to candidates and political parties” (Carmines and
Stimson 1980, 78). People feel these issues in their guts; they have an emotional
reaction to these issues. Furthermore, easy issues allow a gut response to be “elicited
equally from well-informed and ill-informed, from interested and uninterested, from
active and apathetic voters” (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80). All voters, regardless
of their level of political sophistication, can understand and use these issues. They do
so without any reference to a deep thought process that involves carefully weighing
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a series of policy alternatives. Their understanding of these issues is not through a
thorough, technical understanding of the details of the issue or the various policy
proposals being offered. Even if the issue has technical components, as basically
all issues do, when an issue is easy, “the typical voter sees in it a simple issue”
(Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80).
As a result of easy issues being so emotional and understood in the gut, when
confronted with an issue, it should not take a lot of effort to give a response. The
responses, opinions, or attitudes are readily available to express.1 Whether this
occurs because of a reaction to the groups or parties associated with an issue, or
the attachment of core values to it, it is an automatic response.2 When respondents
are asked to give an opinion on easy issues, they have a gut reaction and therefore
should not require much time or effort to provide an answer.
Therefore, although people do not know much about politics by ideal stan-
dards, if there are “easy” issues, people must be able to develop relatively stable at-
titudes on these issues. Without such attitude pre-consolidation, preferences about
these issues would not be so readily available. As a result, we should see lower levels
of non-response on questions related to these issues. In the first part of this chap-
1Although Carmines and Stimson are specifically discussing easy issue voting, it is not a far reach
to say that if issues are easy and understood at a gut level for voting, then they are understood
for the purposes of survey questions, which only requires giving an attitude preference and not
even the second step of issue voting—the respondent attaching his/her opinion to the parties or
candidates in the election.
2The specifics of the heuristics and cues which trigger easy issues are discussed in later chapters.
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ter, I search for evidence of easy issues by examining item non-response (or “don’t
know” answers) on surveys. If an issue really is easy, then the first hurdle should be
that people can provide a valid response when asked about the issue.
3.2 Theorizing about “Don’t Know” Responses
Survey research practitioners and scholars have both focused on what prob-
lems “don’t know” responses on items might cause, and what the sources of this
might be. They have debated how much the quality of the data suffer as a result
of non-response, as well as theorized why people fail to provide answers to some
questions. Much of the literature on non-response focuses on how we should deal
with it as researchers—how to craft survey questions because of it and how to deal
with non-response when analyzing data (such as imputation, or other ways to fill in
missing values). There is reason to expect that non-response can provide substan-
tive information about public opinion as well. For example, Achen (1975) analyzes
“don’t know” responses to show that even though people may give a no opinion
response in one wave of a panel survey, they might still express meaningful opinions
in other waves, and so “don’t know” responses do not always mean that someone
does not know.
There are many reasons cited in the literature for why people say that they
“don’t know” the answer to survey questions, ranging from problems with the ques-
tions, to interviewer effects, to specific respondent characteristics that make “don’t
know” responses more likely. The reasons can be grouped into three primary causes:
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the difficulty of the task involved, respondent ability, and respondent motivation
(Krosnick 1991).
The difficulty of the task is “a function of the difficulty of each of the four
cognitive stages” a respondent goes through to answer a given question. The four
stages a person goes through to answer a survey question are: comprehension, re-
trieval, judgement, and response3(Tourangeau 1984, Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988,
Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000, 73). In the first stage, respondents interpret
the question and determine what it is asking about—identify what information is
sought. Several problems can occur at this stage, especially when an issue is un-
familiar to a respondent (i.e. it is not salient) and the person cannot determine
what attitudes are relevant to the item (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988). In the re-
trieval stage, respondents must search their memories for relevant information and
retrieve it from memory. Again, there are several ways for complications to occur
during this step, but priming is especially relevant here. Priming effects (discussed
in chapter 4) will depend upon how much thought respondents give to the answer
and how obvious the context is (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988). In the judgement
step, respondents must grapple with the multiple considerations brought to mind
and produce a summary judgement.
It is important to recognize that a “summary judgement” does not necessarily
3Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski (2000) recognize that these four stages sometimes are not four
separate response stages because people can completely skip components of it, carry out multiple
components parallel to each other, and backtrack. Yet, they argue that this is the most common
order.
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mean a long-standing attitude. In reality,
“there is a continuum corresponding to how well articulated a respon-
dent’s attitude is. At the more articulated end, the respondent has a
preformed opinion just waiting to be offered to the interviewer; at the
less articulated end, the respondent has no opinion whatever. Between
these extremes, he or she may have a loosely related set of ideas to use
in constructing an opinion or even a moderately well-formed viewpoint
to draw on” (Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000).
Even when an issue is relatively familiar, there are people who do not have
stable views on the issue. Research has shown survey responses sometimes shift
dramatically with variations in question wording or question ordering, and
“even if respondents do have more crystallized views about an issue,
these views may not lend themselves to a clear-cut answer to the question
at hand. The survey item may ask about an aspect of the issue that the
respondent has not thought about. For instance, an item on the GSS
asks whether abortions should be permitted in the case of rape; this item
may give even ardent pro-life advocates reason to stop and reflect before
they answer” (Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000, 13).
There are different ways people can go about this, and this step can also
be affected by respondent characteristics. As a result, the judgements are tempo-
rary constructs because they are created by people to respond to a survey question
(Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000, 197).
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Finally, respondents must take this summary judgement and map it onto the
available survey response options. Sometimes people can give open-ended responses
in which they get to make their own answer (e.g., “most important problem” ques-
tions), but almost all questions in political surveys are close-ended questions that
require them to pick from a set of categories or choose a place on a scale (e.g., feeling
thermometer ratings). The quality of survey responses can also be compromised in
this step as people may experience difficulties choosing a fixed response that rep-
resents their attitude.4 Specifically, “even when respondents have a clear answer
to report, it may not be clear to them how to report it” (Tourangeau, Rips and
Rasinski 2000, 13).
This process can be long and take a good deal of effort. People will not
always carefully perform each of these steps in the process. Whenever respondents
shortcut or skip steps to avoid the substantial cognitive effort required to carefully
work through all for steps of the process, Krosnick (1991), Krosnick and Alwin
(1987) refers to it as “satisficing.”5 When “satisficing,” respondents only try to
understand the question well enough to provide a plausible answer. They do not try
to understand the question completely or retrieve all relevant information regarding
4Zaller (1992) argues that this model, although simpler than some models for how people make
decisions posited in the psychology literate, is too complex. He argues that the only important
step in the process is the retrieval of considerations from memory. He also argues that there is
limited ability to empirically distinguish between the steps using survey data. Therefore, he argues
for the RAS model instead.
5The term, as Krosnick notes, was originally coined by Simon (1957).
48
the question. Instead, they try to do just enough work to get an answer (Tourangeau,
Rips and Rasinski 2000).
There are two intensities of this behavior. When a respondent is short-cutting
some of the steps in the process it is called “weak satisficing.” When weak satisficing
occurs, the respondent is still performing all four steps, but there is “incomplete or
biased information retrieval and/or information integration” (Krosnick 1991, 213).
Respondents can do this by agreeing with assertions, endorsing the status quo, se-
lecting the first reasonable response option, or other energy-saving behaviors. Re-
spondents can also engage in “strong satisficing” in which they skip steps entirely
and have no information retrieval or integration (Krosnick, 213). Giving a “don’t
know response” can be a form of strong satisficing. When respondents say that
they “don’t know,” they do not have to retrieve any information or make a judge-
ment. Conversely, when all four steps are performed carefully it is referred to as
“optimizing.”
Task difficulty can be an issue in any of these stages. Some questions are
difficult to interpret because they are very long, or contain words that are uncom-
mon, words with multiple meanings, or something else that makes understanding the
question challenging. If a respondent is asked to recall information from a previous
time, or if the respondent is asked to make comparative judgements across multiple
objects at once, these can make answering the questions more difficult. The pace
of the interview as well as distractions present can also increase the challenges a
respondent faces.
Respondent ability also plays a key role in determining who is more likely to
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say that they “don’t know” the answer to a question. The people who respond “dont
know” (DK) to survey questions have been studied for decades. Although there have
been some dissenting scholars, the differences between people who respond DK and
people who provide meaningful answers have been well documented. Education,
race, age, type of occupation and gender have all been found to affect the number of
DK responses provided by respondents during surveys. People who are more highly
educated, white, younger, male and/or employed in more prestigious occupations
are more likely to complete a survey in its entirety than their counterparts (Ferber
1966). There has been debate about the direct impact of some of these variables.
For example, there is some evidence that the impact of age on DK responses is
actually dependent upon the education level of the respondents, which accounts
for all of the age effect (Gergen and Back 1966). Other scholars have noted that
there are cultural differences that lead people to have a different willingness to
admit a DK response (Sicinski 1970). Those with lower levels of political efficacy,
who are less involved in politics and who have little influence in decision-making
processes, have also been shown to have lower response rates (although arguably
many of these factors are related—people with less education are usually in less
prestigious professions, are less involved in politics, have less political efficacy, etc.).
What is most important from all of these findings is that nonresponse is not random
(Francis and Busch 1975). This leads to possible bias in survey results. Both item
nonresponse and total survey nonresponse have been shown to cause bias in the
survey results, although there is some debate as to how much and how potentially
harmful the bias is to the estimation of parameters.
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Respondent ability has three components—cognitive sophistication, amount of
practice with an issue, and the degree to which a respondent has a “preconsolidated
attitude” (Krosnick 1991, 223). Cognitive sophistication refers not to general intelli-
gence, but is “best viewed as the ensemble of abilities needed to retrieve information
from memory and integrate that information into verbally expressed summary judge-
ments” (Krosnick 1991, 222). The more cognitively sophisticated a person is, the
more able s/he is to be able to provide thoughtful answers on a survey. The amount
of practice that a respondent has had with a particular topic also plays a role in
determining the quality of her response. People who have experience with “domain-
relevant thought have more relevant knowledge in memory and have more practice
at executing the necessary cognitive procedures” (Krosnick 1991, 223). Finally, the
extent to which a respondent already has a “preconsolidated attitude” on an issue
influences her ability to give a response to a question. Sometimes people “have
unambiguous evaluations” stored in memory and therefore can answer questions
about these topics with little effort. When people have “preconsolidated attitudes,”
or crystallized attitudes, “the retrieval step in the response process should occur
quickly and automatically upon the mere mention of the attitude object” (Krosnick
1991, 223). Although Krosnick never makes a connection between easy issues and
respondent ability to provide valid answers, the language is reminiscent of Carmines’
and Stimson’s description of easy issues. The process should occur “automatically”
when the issue is merely mentioned—or there should be a gut-level reaction.
Finally, respondent motivation is also critical for whether a person gives a valid
response. Respondent motivation includes numerous factors, including the length of
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the interview, the interviewer behavior, and the respondent’s belief that s/he will be
held accountable for her answers or that her answers are somehow contributing to
“desirable social outcomes” (Krosnick 1991, 223-225). These factors are theoretically
unimportant for the assessment of easy and hard issues. However, the need for
cognition and personal importance of the issue are theoretically essential. People
who have a need for cognition “enjoy thinking, get intrinsic rewards for effortful
mental exercises, and prefer to confront demanding cognitive tasks instead of easy
ones” (Krosnick 1991, 223).
Although there are several reasons why people might engage in satisficing,
two of them are of particular theoretical importance when discussing easy and hard
issues. Most of the forms of satisficing (including accepting the first reasonable
response alternative, agreeing with assertions, endorsing the status quo, and non-
differentiation) are related to respondent level of education or cognitive sophistica-
tion. People with less education are more likely to engage in a variety of satisficing
behaviors, including giving “don’t know” responses (Krosnick 1991).
3.3 Item Non-response as a Measure of “Easy”
Issues
This, again, clearly links to the theory of easy and hard issues. Higher “don’t
know” response rates are expected for harder issues. There are several caveats
on drawing an immediate conclusion supporting easy issues. First, Krosnick does
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note that, although the perceived short-cuts such as agreeing with assertions and
endorsing the status quo are often the result of satisficing, sometimes they can
result from optimizing. This is true for all of the methods for satisficing, but for
“don’t know” responses in particular, because a person may really not know the
answer. This poses a potential challenge to the use of item non-response as a measure
for issue easiness, because if “don’t know” responses are unrelated to respondent
sophistication it could be due to everyone knowing the answer (the issue is easy),
or sophisticated people are optimizing while less sophisticated people are satisficing
on the issue at the same time, thereby washing out the effects of sophistication.
However, this should not be the case if the overall item non-response is low on the
issue. If overall item non-response is low, and item non-response on the issue is
unrelated to sophistication, then the evidence supports the theory of easy issues.
Second, whether the question filters for non-response can also change the num-
ber of “don’t know” answers in a way that is not explained by the easy/hard issue
distinction. The practice of probing “don’t know” responses has been the subject
of some scholarly controversy. At its face value, probing respondents in order to
obtain a meaningful value rather than a DK response seems to improve the quality
of the data. However, there is some evidence that when respondents are pushed to
provide a response, they will make up an answer. In a study by Bishop, Tuchfarber
and Oldendick, when respondents were surveyed about fictitious people and places,
if they were pressed by the interviewer to provide a response, they were more likely
to make up an answer about something of which they had obviously never heard.
Once again, less educated respondents and nonwhite respondents were more likely to
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make up an answer under pressure (Bishop and Oldendick 1986). Other studies have
found similar results. In a Schuman and Presser study, when interviewers repeated
the question following a DK response, more pressure was placed on respondents,
especially less educated respondents, to provide an answer (Schuman and Presser
1981). Such results have generated debate about whether respondents should au-
tomatically be probed for DK responses, or whether they should only be probed in
some circumstances.
In the case of American National Election Studies (NES) data, some questions
are consistently probed, others are never probed, and some are probed depending
upon the year of the study. Even more problematic, the “don’t know” responses
are not always separated out from other missing codes, especially in earlier years.
Sometimes, “inappropriate” (usually because the respondent was asked a different
form of the survey), refused, or other missing codes are mixed together, making
it impossible to isolate true “don’t know” answers. This occasionally limited the
questions available for me to use on the surveys as I avoided items that had such
limitations. Also problematic, some questions indicate to people that it is okay to
give a “don’t know” response by filtering responses with a prior question for whether
the respondent knows enough about an issue to have an opinion, or uses a phrase
like “haven’t you thought much about this.” When “quasi filters” offer respondents
an explicit choice for no opinion, it can increase the percentage of DK responses
(Schuman and Presser 1981, 1980, 1979). As a result, when discussing the results I
include information about which questions included non-response prompts.
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3.4 Item Non-response in the NES by Year
In order to get a sense for what issues American’s hold opinions on, I looked
at the NES data for all of the presidential election years from 1972 to 2008 (except
for 1992 and 2000 because of issues with the data6). By looking at multiple years
of data, patterns in non-response are visible. In picking issues to include for each
year, I tried to use some of the same issues, when available, to enable a comparison
of non-response levels.7 Obviously, though, since the NES is trying to gauge public
opinion about the issues of the day, there are noticeable and telling changes in the
questions that are asked from 1972 to 2008. I tried to capture issues that were
important in each presidential campaign as well.
In 1972, for example, there is a whole battery of race-related questions (equal
employment opportunities and access to public facilities for blacks, as well as school
6The NES data for 1992 are only available as part of a 1990-1991-1992 panel study. Based
on previous research on item non-response, I do not think it is fair to compare non-response
rates for respondents who are part of a panel study versus others. Although there are some new
respondents in 1992, the sample sizes for DK responses are already very small in most cases in
the other years of the NES. In 2000, the NES ran a survey experiment exploring the effect of
the “haven’t thought much about this” option, thereby making it unsuitable for an analysis of
the percentage of respondents who replied “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about this.”
Therefore, these two years are excluded.
7Sometimes there are changes in the question wording from one year to another. This can
obviously lead to changes in non-response due to question wording changes. However, often changes
to the questions are minimal. When a change in question wording is more meaningful to possible
item non-response (such as offering a “haven’t thought much about that” option), I try to note it.
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integration and busing to achieve integration, segregation, and more) along with
questions about the Vietnam War, China, and communism. Many questions in
the 1980’s focused on the economy (taxes and inflation), government spending and
foreign policy issues involving U.S. relations with Russia, Iran Contra, and Central
America. The 2000’s see the introduction of questions about new issues that were not
part of the American political landscape before, like gay rights (gays in the military,
gay adoption, gay marriage, and laws preventing discrimination against gays) and
illegal immigration. In the post 9/11 era, questions about terrorism appear. There
are also common issues stretching across a number of years (in some form) as well,
such as the environment, defense spending, spending on different social issues (food
stamps, public schools, crime prevention), government supplied health insurance,
the death penalty, and abortion.
Starting with the most recent election, figure 3.1 shows the percentage of item
non-response on various issues in the 2008 NES.8 Abortion has the lowest non-
response rate with less than 1% saying that they “didn’t know” about abortion.
Social security spending, gay marriage, citizenship for illegal immigrants, and a host
of other issues also had very low DK percentages. Several hot political topics, such
as the U.S. government bailout of financial institutions and government supplied
health insurance, had higher non-response around 10-15%. By far, the issue with
the highest percentage of DK responses was limiting foreign imports—nearly 50%.
This is not unique to 2008, either. Limiting foreign imports has very high non-
8The responses for 2008, 2004, and 1996 are all weighted. The previous years do not include
appropriate weights/do not need weights.
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response rates in 2004, 1996, and 1988. Based on the number of years of data,
the tables for 2004, 1988, and 1976 appear in the appendix for this chapter. The
non-response rates for 1996 appear in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 2008 NES
Several other repeated items have relatively high non-response rates as well,
although none come close to that of limiting foreign imports. The spending-services
scale (whether government should provide fewer services and cut spending, or pro-
vide more services even if it requires increasing spending), the environment versus
jobs scale (whether we should protect the environment even if it may cause job
loss), government supplied health insurance, defense spending, and government as-
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Figure 3.2: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1996 NES
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sistance to blacks also have DK response rates that hover around 15-20% with few
exceptions.9 On the other hand, abortion, gay marriage, social security spending,
affirmative action, public school spending, and crime prevention spending have fairly
consistent low DK response rates. For the most part, these issues have a less than
1% to at the most 5% DK response rate.
Within a specific year (or two), there are a few items that approach the DK
response rate of limiting foreign imports. U.S. involvement in Central American
(1984) has roughly 30% non-response, and U.S. Relations with Russia (1980 and
1984) has roughly 20% non-response. These issues, with less performance oriented
evaluations of foreign policy, have higher DK rates. Whether the U.S. should rec-
ognize mainland China (1972) also has higher non-response (around 20%). The DK
rates for 1972, 1984, and 1980 appear in figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, respectively.
The same is true for several economic issues. The appropriate tax rate for
the wealthy (1972) had approximately 20% non-response. Instituting a 30% tax cut
and whether the government should focus on the inflation rate or the unemployment
rate (both 1980) had nearly 40% non-response. The federal bailout plan (2008) was
easier by comparison; it garnered around 12% non-response.
Interestingly, many of these items are fairly specific—they ask about a more
9Several of these issues are the ones that additionally offer people whether they “haven’t thought
much about it” which could be partly the reason for higher DK rates on government health
insurance, defense spending, and assistance to blacks. On the other hand, though, other questions
that offer people the “haven’t thought much about it” escape do not have similarly high levels of
non-response, such as women’s role.
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Figure 3.3: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1972 NES
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Figure 3.4: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1984 NES
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Figure 3.5: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1980 NES
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concrete policy proposal like giving a 30% tax cut to everyone or whether the U.S.
should recognize China. In some cases, ambiguity in the questions could lead to
higher non-response rates. A question like the spending-services scale, that is about
whether the government should cut abstract, unspecified programs in order to reduce
spending, leaves open multiple interpretations. A question that is so abstract and
vague could lead to higher non-response just because people are not sure what the
question is asking about. Most of the questions with higher non-response, though,
have clearer topics.
There are several notable exceptions to this pattern of non-response for eco-
nomic and foreign policy issues. Whether the U.S. should try to stop the spread of
communism, and whether the government should cut taxes even if it means cutting
spending (both 1988) had only about 1% DK responses. Terrorism related ques-
tions in 2004 also had very low non-response. Less than 2% of respondents said they
“didn’t know” about whether the government should increase or decrease spending
to combat terrorism and how important the foreign policy goal of combating inter-
national terrorism should be.
3.5 Examining What is on the Minds of Ameri-
cans
Americans do seem to have a harder time overall answering questions about
foreign policy and economic issues. Yet in a world full of non-responding, coin-
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flipping, making it up as they go along respondents, we see amazing regularity and
structure to what Americans consider to be important. Despite stunning gaps in
knowledge and limited awareness of politics, Americans are consistently preoccupied
with economic and foreign policy issues.
Again I use all presidential election years from the NES (except 2000 and
1992) to examine what people think is the most important problem facing the U.S.
in each election year. The results are presented in figures 3.6-3.12. These figures
show the top five responses to the “most important issue” question in each year. The
most important problem responses paint a very different picture of the American
electorate’s minds than the non-response rates. The number one most important
issue is either an economic or foreign policy issue in every single year with only one
exception. In 1996, the budget deficit and crime are tied for the top spot. Overall,
the top five issues of concern are dominated by foreign policy and economic issues
across all the years except 1996.
In 1996, during a period of relative peace and prosperity in the U.S., and a very
uncompetitive re-election campaign, crime, social welfare problems, and education
were able to crack the top five most important issues. The percentage of respondents
who said these were the most important issues, however, was comparatively low.
Only 15% said that crime was the most important problem (the same as the budget
deficit), and less than 10% said that social welfare problems or education were
important. When compared to concern over terrorists in 2004, for example, these
issues seem relatively unimportant. Nearly 45%, 1 in 2 people, said terrorists were
the most important problem facing the country in 2004 (as shown in figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.6: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1996 NES
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Figure 3.7: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 2004 NES
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Similarly, in 1980 (figure 3.8), more than 35% of respondents said that inflation
was their number one concern. An additional 15% said that either unemployment
or the economy in general was the most important issue. The other two issues that
made the top five in 1980—concern over disarmament and Iran/the hostage crisis—
were foreign policy issues. Not one issue in the top five dealt with something other
than the economy or foreign policy.
Figure 3.8: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1980 NES
The same is true for 1984. The number one most important issue was the
budget deficit, while the second issue on people’s minds was unemployment (figure
3.9). The third and fourth were foreign policy issues—the possibility of a nuclear
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war and the establishment of peace/prevention of war. Finally, inflation, which was
in the top two spots in 1972, 1976, and 1980, held on to the fifth spot.
Figure 3.9: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1984 NES
In 1988, 1976, and 1972 (figures 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12, respectively), the pre-
dominate concerns are still foreign policy and economic issues (the budget deficit,
unemployment, and the Vietnam War, respectively). There are several other issues
that make the list, though. These include racial problems (1972), housing (1988),
and drugs and crime.
Note that most widely regarded “easy” issues are conspicuously absent from
these lists. Issues like abortion, gay marriage, prayer in school, and a number of
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Figure 3.10: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1988 NES
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Figure 3.11: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1976 NES
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Figure 3.12: “Most Important Problem” Responses in the 1972 NES
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other moral and social issues never appear on the list of the top five most important
issues facing the country. For reference, only one person out of the whole sample in
2004 mentioned abortion. Only 2% said that “moral decay” was the most important
issue. In 1996, abortion was listed as the most important issue by two people and
moral decay was the primary concern of only 5% of the respondents. This pattern
is not new. In 1972, 3% of the sample said that “moral decay” was the most
important problem and 1% said that problems with young people (like drinking,
sexual freedom, discipline, etc.) was their primary concern.
Critics of my analysis might claim that I coded the responses in favor of my
argument and that the net for “economic” issues was cast wide while I only counted
responses strictly pertaining to abortion, for example. However, I neither devised
nor executed this coding scheme. The NES coded the open ended responses into the
categories that I used, and I simply looked at which issues had the highest number of
mentions in each election. Possibly, one could argue that the “economy” or “foreign
policy” are general catch-alls and that is why the most important problem mentions
are higher for those issues. Again, though, I am using the terms “economy” and
“foreign policy” when writing, but the actual issues, like inflation or Vietnam troop
withdrawal, are no more general than “crime” or “drugs.”
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3.6 Why Americans are Preoccupied with “Hard”
Issues
The description of hard issues leads us to expect that the public will not be
aware of a hard issue (it will not be salient to many people), that people cannot
place the candidates or parties on the issue, and that the issue cannot influence
vote choice—at least not for those with low political sophistication. Hard issues
are technical, they are about policy means, they are new to the political agenda,
and we expect that people will not know about this issue or understand the debate
occurring around the issue. Even if more sophisticated and aware voters know what
is going on, the least knowledgeable voters will not. However, this is not the pattern
that unfolds.
Over the last two chapters a puzzle about the nature of foreign policy and
economic issues has emerged. The general understanding, as posited by Carmines
and Stimson, is that these issues are intrinsically “hard” because of their technical
details. Therefore, less politically knowledgeable people cannot use these issues to
vote, and by extension, will not be able to develop attitudes on these issues. Yet
empirically, we see in chapter 2 this is not the case. Based on the understanding of
easy and hard issues that has developed in the literature, it is surprising to find that
foreign policy and economic issues are powerful predictors of vote choice. Why do
we see that people are voting on hard, technical issues rather than ones that might
be more accessible?
In this chapter, we see that on the one hand, Americans have difficulty answer-
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ing questions about foreign policy and the economy when asked; there are generally
higher non-response rates for these issues across years. On the other hand, these
issues totally engross the minds of Americans; these two issue domains dominate the
most important issue responses. Why is it that Americans know little about these
issues given that they are so important? Why do they vote on these issues if they
know relatively little about them? Is it because these issues truly are so complex
and technical that they are inherently “hard”? Why is it that people do not find
out more information about these issues if they are so important? We could easily
dismiss the American public as too apathetic and uneducated to be able to do so.
Even if that were true, why is it that politicians do not make these issues accessible
to people through the use of frames, then?
3.7 A Third Type of Issues
Interestingly, the theory of retrospective voting generates predictions opposite
to those stemming from the theory of easy and hard issues. The theory of easy issues
claims that those who are most politically knowledgeable will vote based on “hard”
issues like foreign policy and the economy. The theory of retrospective voting, on
the other hand, argues that the connection between retrospective evaluations (e.g.
the “nature of the times voters,” those who ask “am I better off now than I was
4 years ago”) should be highest for the least aware people. Most often, the issues
people are asking themselves about are economic or foreign policy issues when they
ask if they are better off now. So the theory of retrospective voting predicts that
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“hard” issues, like the economy and foreign policy issues, may actually be most often
used by the least sophisticated voters because they are able to make choices based
on what they have observed about politics in the years leading up to an election.
“They need not know the precise economic or foreign policy policies of
the incumbent administration in order to see or feel the results of those
policies. And it is not reasonable to base voting decisions on results as
well as on intentions? In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have
performed poorly or well, citizens need only to calculate the changes in
their own welfare. If jobs have been lost in a recession, something is
wrong. If sons have died in foreign rice paddies, something is wrong
. . . ” (Fiorina 1981, 5).
I depart from Fiorina in that I do not think all issues are, or can be, evaluated
retrospectively. I believe that Carmines and Stimson are right in thinking about
different types of issues. There are certain issues that more naturally lend themselves
to a clear voter interpretation and they do not need political sophistication to know
how they feel about these issues. I argue that issues like foreign policy and the
economy are performance issues and are unique from most other issues based on
one of Carmines’ and Stimson’s original criteria. These issues are mostly viewed
solely in terms of policy ends and not policy means. This, however, is not what
Carmines and Stimson would predict based on the complex and technical nature
of these issues. Yet they are seen this way by the majority of the public and are
important to the vote (regardless of their technical content) for three reasons.
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First, these issues are often highly salient. Although people may have gut
reactions to issues involving race or morals, these issues are not as important to
voters as issues of foreign affairs and the economy. As we saw from the “most
important issue” responses, people worry about the economy and foreign policy
more than they do about about any other issues. Second, the nature of these issues
is important for understanding why people vote on them rather than other issues,
but it is not the easiness or hardness of the issue that matters. Foreign affairs
and the economy are largely performance issues, or “valence” issues, with only one
constituency. There is no constituency for a lousy economy or a never-ending war we
are losing. Therefore, if a candidate or his/her party is in power, and the economy
or foreign affairs are bad, they are in a bad spot. They will get the blame for the
problems, and there are few opportunities for them to argue that their policy is
morally or intellectually superior if times are bad. This is an important extension
of the existing literature. This means there is virtually no room for politicians to
frame. Little or no pandering can occur on these issues because no way to frame why
failure on these issues is good and we should feel good about it. The lack of framing
that we see on these issues, therefore, is not because they are “hard” issues and
are so complex that people cannot understand these issues even given the frames
of politicians. On the contrary, the lack of framing characteristic of these issues is
because framing is nearly impossible for these issues.
Finally, also characteristic of these issues are performance updates. Unlike
moral issues like abortion, gay marriage, etc. that do not have a factual check-
point, there is a continuous flow of information to the public about these issues, with
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virtually no way to fool people into thinking things are okay if they are not. On moral
or social issues, politicians work to frame these issues in terms of group-based conflict
or core values because they can. There is really no way to assess what is right or
wrong; the assessment of a policy’s success on these issues is subjective. For foreign
affairs and the economy, though, there is information available about the number
of troops committed to a war, the number that have died fighting, the amount
of money spent on the war, the duration of the war, the level of unemployment,
inflation, and many other quantifiable ways to assess success. Many people may
intuitively know how things are going in regards to these issues as well, based on
their own employment status, changes in income, or number of tours their child has
served in the war. People do not follow every debate on these issues because there




Figure 3.13: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 2004 NES
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Figure 3.14: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1988 NES
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Figure 3.15: “Don’t Know” Responses in the 1976 NES
80
Chapter 4
Framing Hard Issues as Easy?
In “The Two Faces of Issue Voting,” Carmines and Stimson (1980) argue that
desegregation could have been hard instead of easy, and Vietnam withdrawal could
have been easy instead of hard, “if the issues had evolved that way in the political
system and if voters saw them that way. All issues have intrinsically simple and
complex facets; which particular facets predominate at a given time is an empirical
question” (81) (emphasis in original). Many scholars since this time, though, have
treated the easiness or hardness of an issue as a static characteristic. Issues of
foreign policy or the economy have been labeled as “hard” issues because they are
complex issues involving places far from home, political and economic systems with
dozens of components and complicated concepts, or other problems that do not
reach people in their daily lives. Issues like abortion and gay marriage, on the other
hand, have been designated as “easy” issues because they involve a gut-level reaction
to readily identifiable groups or disputes. However, there is reason to believe that
an issue’s easiness or hardness depends upon the political environment in which
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it exists. In this chapter I explore the notion of malleable easiness using survey
framing experiments. I find that even “hard” issues can be made easier through the
use of frames, but this transformation depends upon the nature of the frames and
the sophistication and values of the respondents.
The understanding that some issues are inherently, automatically “easy” is
theoretically and conceptually suspect. Although it is intuitively appealing that
some issues will be intrinsically easy for people because they deal with life and death,
or readily identifiable groups or values, there are reasons to question the validity of
this argument. First, we see that issue easiness is clearly dependent upon a society’s
understanding of the issue. Which issues are important at all is determined by the
society’s interests and focus. For example, abortion is hotly debated in the United
States, but in other countries around the world, it is not really an issue. Abortions
are accepted in some societies as a means of population control and it is considered
a medical procedure. There are no special abortion clinics or protestors at facilities
that perform abortions. Although abortion is so controversial in the U.S., it is not
so emotional everywhere in the world (as is discussed in chapter 5). Second, issue
easiness can change over time for an issue. As Carmines and Stimson themselves
argue, the length of time on the agenda can matter for the easiness of an issue. An
issue may be hard to understand when it first comes about, but it gets easier as it
is discussed in political discourse and frames are developed and repeated. An issue
that starts out hard does not have to remain that way forever, also casting doubt
on the concept of inherent easiness. We see evidence of this in previous chapters.
These characteristics of issues, though, are not readily changeable. The length of
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time on the political agenda or the cultural importance of an issue cannot be altered
in a short period of time (it would probably take a decade or more) and cannot be
manipulated in a laboratory setting. It is not possible to get at these characteristics
via experiments.
However, the way an issue is framed can have implications for whether people
understand the issue, and can be manipulated in a laboratory setting, allowing a
more causal analysis of the sources of easiness. Issues that are framed in an easy way
can be easy for voters, even if the issues are hard by traditional standards.1 Non-
salient issues that have many additional considerations or concepts involved in them
can be made easier for people when they are given an “easy” frame that emphasizes
groups associated with a policy to give the abstract ideas a more concrete basis for
how it effects the person’s life.
4.1 The Search for Framing Effects
There is a vast literature on framing and framing effects in political science.
Scholars have recognized that framing is a critical part of our system as “in a democ-
racy, where political accomplishment so often depends on mobilizing public support,
the transmission of persuasive appeals never stops” (Nelson 1999, 1040). Studies
have analyzed the impact of frame sources (whether the source seems credible or
not), the people most responsive to frames (politically aware or partisan individu-
1See Leege (2002) et al. and Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) for discussions of easy or emotional
arguments
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als versus others), potential limitations on framing, and the psychological process
behind framing effects. In a few decades, researchers amassed a large body of lit-
erature on framing that shows “a rare degree of agreement with respect to both
causal reasoning and empirical results. How citizens think about a public issue, it
is now widely if not universally agreed, depends on how it is framed” (Sniderman
and Theriault 2004, 135).
Framing “refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of
a perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation
of that reality” (Entman 2004, 26). Frames help us, as a society, decide what
something is even about. Through the use of framing, “communicators seek to
establish a dominant definition or construction of an issue. In a way, issue framing
is issue categorization: a declaration of what a policy dispute is really all about,
and what it has nothing to do with” (Nelson 1999, 1059). Issue frames provide
“alternative definitions, constructions, or depictions of a policy problem” (Nelson
1999, 1041).
In a traditional sense, framing effects occur when “logically equivalent (but
not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose
different options” (Rabin 1998). An example of this when patients are given the
option to have surgery and more people choose surgery when they are told that
95 out of 100 patients survive than when they are told that 5 out of 100 patients
die. These are equivalent statements and provide identical information, but the
way the information is presented changes the percentage of patients who choose
surgery (Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Political science scholars generally are
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more open in their definition of framing effects and include “when, in the course of
describing an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant
considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing
their opinions” (Druckman 2001).
The literature discusses framing effects in several ways, distinguishing cuing,
priming, and persuasion. These effects are grouped in two general categories—
changing overall opinions or changing the considerations that are relevant. There is a
distinction between belief content and belief importance in the literature (Druckman
2001). Altering belief content is persuasion—it “takes place when a communicator
effectively revises the content of one’s beliefs about the attitude object, replacing
or supplementing favorable thoughts with unfavorable ones, or vice versa” (Nel-
son 1999, 1040-1041). Framing, though, does not have to persuade to be effective.
Framing also “can influence attitudes without altering the content of one’s beliefs
about the attitude object” (Nelson 1999, 1041) through priming certain consider-
ations. Rather than actually changing someone’s mind, certain predispositions or
beliefs can be primed (brought to the “top-of-the-head,” as Zaller describes it) and
be made relevant for the issue at hand.
This distinction may be best illustrated by an example. The healthcare reform
bill of 2010 generated much attention in the media and public discussion. Proponents
and opponents of the bill both worked to move people to their side of the debate.
A persuasive message would convince people who like the bill or are neutral on
the bill to dislike it, possibly by telling them that it will be bad for them or their
family. This brute-force persuasion seems unlikely. Instead, people who are already
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inclined to dislike the bill will probably hear and repeat these cues because they
agree with them. On the other hand, people could change their minds because they
come to view the healthcare bill as something more than healthcare reform. Instead,
if abortion is made salient (as it was), the bill is no longer about healthcare reform,
but about whether government funds should be used to perform abortions. If tax
policy is cued, the bill becomes about whether people want to pay taxes on their
employer-supplied health insurance and the amount of taxes paid. Rather than
persuading people that their opinion is wrong, these frames work through changing
what the issue is about. Even if someone wants healthcare reform, they may oppose
the bill because they view it as an abortion issue, for example.
My survey experiments are designed to affect attitudes through changing the
relevant considerations rather than persuading people to change their minds. The
frames are intended to make particular groups, emotions, or values salient by chang-
ing what the issue is about. Limits on foreign imports is about groups and jobs in
the emotional frame and about tariffs and customs standards in the technical frame.
The frames are two-sided and intended to bring up new considerations, rather than
to persuade.
Although framing effects of multiple types have widely been recognized, not all
people are equally susceptible to frames. Some scholars have found that people with
low levels of political knowledge are most susceptible to frames because they have
fewer opinions (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2002). Other scholars argue that framing
should be more effective among more knowledgeable people because they are more
likely to hear the frames and then connect them with their overall opinions (Nelson,
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Clawson and Oxley 1997). For people who have more political knowledge already,
they can make better use of the new information. The more sophisticated people are
faster and more efficient at interpreting the information and storing it in memory
(Krosnick and Brannon 1993). However, for my frames, there is no intermediate step
requiring people to be attentive to politics in order to hear the frames. By virtue
of answering the question people were exposed to the frames. Based on this, and
my understanding of easy issues, I expect that people who are more sophisticated
will be able to use both frames (emotional or technical) to shape their opinions
on the “hard” issues (limiting foreign imports, U.S. participation in the ICC, and
reinstitution of the gold standard), whereas those who are less sophisticated will
only be able to use the emotional frames.
4.2 Creating “Easy” Arguments
As has been previously discussed in the preceding chapters, there are two
interpretations of “easy” issues in the literature. Some argue for intrinsic easiness
while others argue there is nothing inherent about specific issue content that leads
to emotional reactions, but a style of framing or argumentation that determines how
people understand issues. Some argue that it is the policy content of social issues like
abortion, gay marriage, and prayer in schools that makes them visceral for the public,
while others believe framing matters. Carmines and Stimson leave room for multiple
interpretations. Although desegregation is easy in 1972 by their judgement, and
Vietnam withdrawal hard, they allow the possibility that the easiness or hardness
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of these issues could have been reversed if the issues evolved that way and people
understood them that way. However, the specific process by which the easiness of
these issues could have been reversed remains amorphous. Is it really possible that
a switch could have flipped leading desegregation to be a hard issue? What would
have to happen in order for desegregation to become hard to people? Are all issues
equally subject to this fungibility? Although inherent easiness seems unlikely, the
possibility that framing could make an issue like desegregation or abortion hard is
also questionable.
The question then becomes, what frames turn abstract, technical, and “hard”
issues into easier ones that people can express attitudes on? Based on the existing
literature, I argue that three types of content can make issues easier: group-based
attachments, core values, and, often stemming from these, emotion-laden arguments.
All three of these are used to frame the issues for this experiment, as can be seen
from the question wording in the appendix. I argue for these three based on the
previous heuristics literature.
Over the years, scholars have identified many voter heuristics and shortcuts,
including political party identification (Campbell et al. 1960, Downs 1957), using
demographic or personal characteristics of candidates to infer their policy prefer-
ences (Popkin 1991), or the likability of certain groups to extrapolate their policy
positions (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991, Brady and Sniderman 1985). Some
heuristics still require a good bit of attention to politics. Inherently political heuris-
tics (attachments that are formed specifically for politics) like party identification or
ideology are only used by those who are more attentive to politics. Therefore, they
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cannot be the basis for “easy” arguments or issues because they will only be used by
more sophisticated voters whose attitudes are constrained by an ideology or who fol-
low politics closely enough to hear the partisan messages. Core values, on the other
hand, such as egalitarianism and patriotism, are apolitical in the sense that they
are often formed and applied in other areas of people’s lives. They carry meaning
for people outside of political discourse. Core values “reflect abstract, prescriptive
beliefs about humanity, society, and public affairs” (Goren 2005, 881). They are
developed when people are young, are relatively stable and immune to short-term
political forces, and can be used by all people, regardless of political sophistication
(Goren 2004, 2001).
Group-based attachments also can be used by all people, even the politically
unaware, since people tend to think about life in terms of “us” and “them” (Kinder
and Kam 2009). This group-based approach to understanding public opinion focuses
on how voters use feelings toward certain groups to shape their attitudes toward poli-
cies (Gilens 2000, Nelson and Kinder 1996, Kam and Kinder 2007). Voters are most
likely to do this when they are less sophisticated and do not have much information
available. They will substitute group affect for policy debate to form their political
attitudes. For example, attitudes regarding the legality of gay marriage may be
based on one’s feelings toward homosexuals, or attitudes about welfare spending
may be shaped by feelings toward welfare recipients. Feelings toward social groups
can be a means for formulating policy preferences.
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4.3 Selecting “Hard” Issues
I selected three “hard” issues for the experiments: limiting foreign imports,
U.S. participation in the International Criminal Court, and reinstitution of the gold
standard. These issues were picked for two reasons. First, these issues deal with
foreign policy and the economy, the two issue domains most commonly labeled
“hard.” Second, none of these issues have been prominent on the political agenda
recently, yet all three are potentially important political issues. This allows the
frames to be particularly effective in shaping people’s opinions because if the issues
were being currently discussed in the media, people would already have frames in
mind when hearing about the issue, and my frames might have less impact. These
issues, though, could be potentially important political issues, as history shows us;
the issues are not trivial or esoteric.
Limiting Foreign Imports Limiting foreign imports has received the most re-
cent attention of the three issues. In the early 1990’s the North American Free
Trade Act (NAFTA) debate focused attention on the issues of free trade. The idea
for opening trade among the North American countries began with President Reagan
in the early 1980’s. It was debated and shuffled around for a decade, and NAFTA
was finally signed into law by President Clinton and took effect on January 1, 1994.
The goal was to remove trade barriers between the United States and Canada and
Mexico. Some trade tariffs were eliminated immediately and others were staggered
over 15 years, with all provisions finally taking full effect in 2008. Supporters argue
that removing the barriers led to a growth in the U.S. economy. According the the
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government, agricultural exports to Mexico were declining in the years just before
NAFTA, but after the policy was implemented, U.S. agricultural exports to our two
NAFTA partners have grown considerably (USDA 2008). Labor unions and blue
collar workers fought against opening free trade to Mexico and Canada, though,
arguing NAFTA destroys U.S. jobs and gives them to lower paid Mexican laborers,
or that NAFTA has not been that effective because jobs are leaving the U.S. for
China (Ford 2008). This issue deals with complex matters of both foreign policy
and the economy, but has had readily identifiable groups associated with it in the
past few decades, making it a good issue for experimenting whether the right frame
could make this issue seem easy. Limiting foreign imports was also selected as an
issue in part because of the high levels of item non-response in the NES, as we saw
in chapter 3. The non-response rate was 51 % for limiting foreign imports on the
2008 NES, much higher than any other issue.
Gold Standard From 1879-1934, the gold standard was the international mon-
etary system (with the exception of World War I). Under this system, the value of
money is tied to gold (McConnell and Brue 1990, 810). Proponents of this system
argue that the gold standard leads to market stability because it prevents govern-
ments from “manufacturing” money and therefore pumping too much money into
the economy (McConnell and Brue 1990, 342-343). Others argue, however, that
the market is inherently volatile and the gold standard prevents the government
from correcting the market and smoothing out fluctuations (McConnell and Brue
1990, 343). The U.S. no longer operates on the gold standard and instead uses the
floating rates, or “managed floating exchange rates” system (McConnell and Brue
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1990, 810). The transition of our monetary system over time has been the source of
great debate, and the gold standard has also been an issue at several points during
our nation’s history.
The U.S. fell on tough economic times during the mid to late 1800’s, and
the government demonetized silver in 1873, by an act that was virtually unopposed
(Sundquist 1983, 113). Based on continued economic struggles, though, the currency
debate remained hotly contested across the country. The parties were internally
divided over this issue at first. President Cleveland preferred gold but factions of
the Democratic Party were silverites, and pushed the party in this direction. The
issue of whether to use silver for money, although a complicated economic issue,
became defined by two sides.
“Representative Samuel W.T. Lanham of Texas saw the issue as one
between ‘the monetary centers, the national banks, the owners of fixed
incomes, the syndicators of wealth, the possessors of gold, almost every
organized association of capital,’ the ‘money kings,’ the ‘bondholders
and plutocrats,’ on the one side, and ‘men of small means and limited
transactions . . . debtors . . . laborers . . . the varied and multiple sons of
toil . . . those who eat bread by the sweat of their brows,’ on the other”
(Sundquist 1983, 127).
Further articulated in William Jennings Bryan’s “Cross of Gold speech,” he argued
that the opponents of the gold standard would persevere through
“having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world,
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supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the
toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by
saying: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of
thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon this cross of gold” (Boller
2004, 168).
Due to this divide between laborers and bankers, the new frontier and the south
versus the east, this fiscal issue was key to the 1896 presidential election that led to
a partisan realignment.2
International Criminal Court The idea of an international court first stemmed
from the Nuremberg Tribunal. After World War II, the allied countries sought to
punish leaders of Nazi Germany for war crimes through the International Military
Tribunal. In 1945, the allied countries of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed a tribunal to try the
leaders for crimes against humanity and aggressive war (LOC N.d.).
After the Nuremberg trials concluded, several drafts for the International
Criminal Court (ICC) statutes were circulated in the late 1940’s and 1950’s, but
no consensus was reached (ICC 2009). In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, work
began again by the United Nations (UN) to form an international court. In 1998
it was finally established. According to the Rome Statute, the treaty providing
the court with its authority, the court has “power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern” including crimes of
2This issue came up again during the Nixon administration when he removed the U.S. from the
gold standard under which dollars were convertible for gold.
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genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crimes of aggression (ICC
2002). Although more than 100 countries (including the United Kingdom, Canada,
Switzerland, and many other western countries) have signed the Rome Statute, the
United States has not. This issue has not received widespread attention in recent
years in the U.S., despite international attention to the court over the last decade.
All three of these issues are “hard” because they are not currently on the
political agenda and deal with complex matters of foreign policy and the economy.
On the other hand, history has shown that these issues do not necessarily have to
be this way. At times, these issues can be highly symbolic and structured by group
affect or core values. For these reasons, I chose them for my framing experiments.
These issues are so non-salient and complex that they are an especially rigorous test
of whether framing can make technical issues “easy.”
4.4 Experiments in Hard Issue Framing
My framing experiments were conducted as part of the 2009 Cooperative Con-
gressional Election Study (CCES).3 They were administered as part of an online
survey by Polimetrix to 1,000 respondents. Respondents were asked a variety of
questions about other topics as well (including health care and economic stimulus
proposals), and basic demographic and political questions relating to their party
identification, income, etc. For my experiments, respondents were randomly as-
3These experiments were conducted as part of a multi-university module with the University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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signed to one of three conditions4: the control group that received only basic in-
formation about the issue but no cues for who supported the policy or why; an
emotional cue that provided the same content as the control group but additionally
argued how it affects certain groups and real-world reasons for why people support
or oppose it (emotional or personal approach); and a technical cue that provided the
same content as the control group but argued for more abstract, technical reasons
why people support or oppose the policy. The specific question wording appears in
the appendix.
The base cues for all three issues say that some people favor and others oppose
and ask respondents what they think, or whether they “don’t know or haven’t
thought much about it.” For limiting foreign imports, this is the only information
provided in the control frame. For the ICC and gold standard questions, because
respondents may never have heard of these issues, they get an additional sentence
about what it means. For the ICC, they are told that “the International Criminal
Court is a court established to help prosecute crimes that concern the international
community” and for the gold standard they are told that “currently the value of U.S.
dollars adjusts based on supply and demand.” This base information is repeated
for both the emotional and technical treatments as well. This background material
was designed to orient the respondent to the issue in question without cuing any
4In order to ensure the randomization worked, I conducted Tukey Honestly Significant in Differ-
ence Tests for party identification, ideology, age, education, income, gender, and race. The control
and treatment groups are not statistically significantly different from each other, so randomization
is achieved.
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hot-button terms like “genocide,” etc. that could influence their opinions.
For the emotional frames, groups were associated with the policies. The cue
indicated how hard-working Americans, small businessmen, women and children, or
soldiers might be affected by the policy decision. The consequences were also made
explicit in ways that were intended to resonate with the emotions or personal lives
of the respondents. The policies were discussed in terms of rising prices, job losses,
crimes against women and children, or U.S. soldiers being tried by foreigners. The
technical frames, conversely, discussed tariff rates and customs standards, establish-
ing a standard of global behavior, currency stability and market losses, or exchange
rates. These frames emphasize the challenging aspects of establishing new guidelines
on these issues. Both the technical and emotional frames are longer than the base
cue; however, they were kept to approximately the same number of words to ensure
that one cue was not harder simply because of respondent fatigue in reading a long
question. Additionally, both the emotional and technical frames discuss what will
happen as a result of the policy outcome. Carmines and Stimson argue that easier
issues deal with policy ends rather than policy means. Designing frames for a labo-
ratory setting in which one discusses policy ends and the other only mentions policy
means is not possible, though, because the treatments would be wildly different. It
would be comparing apples to oranges so any effects could be due to any number of
differences between the two treatments, like the length, style, etc.
Throughout this chapter, there are two primary variables of interest—the ex-
perimental treatments, and sophistication. Although I use experiments to isolate
the effects of issue framing, the basic idea that people’s answers will differ based
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on level of political knowledge is still important. Political sophistication is mea-
sured as a combination of educational attainment and factual political knowledge.
Education is measured by four categories ranging from 0 to 1—high school or less,
some college and 2-year degree, 4-year degree, and post-graduate education. The
factual knowledge questions include whether people correctly identified which party
had the majority in the House of Representatives prior to the election, which party
had the majority in the Senate prior to the election, that the Democratic Party
is more liberal than the Republican Party, the party affiliation of the Senators in
the respondent’s state, and the party affiliation of the Governor of the respondent’s
state. The number of correct responses were added together and the total was di-
vided by the total number of questions to create an average knowledge measure.
I took the row mean of the factual knowledge questions and education level, then
computed level of sophistication by counting the lowest third of respondents as low
sophistication, the middle third as medium sophistication, and the top third as high
sophistication.5
5I looked at several possible measures for sophistication including just factual knowledge ques-
tions without education and different combinations of factual knowledge questions. The results
are generally the same, so I used the most inclusive measure with as many variables as possible
for the analyses.
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4.5 Item Non-response Based on Frames
As I argue in chapter 3, one of the most basic tests for easy issues is simply
whether the respondents were able to provide a valid response to the question or said
that they “didn’t know or hadn’t thought much about it.” This is a fundamental
test because it indicates whether people have even enough understanding of the
issue to say whether they think it is a good idea or not. If an issue really is easy,
then the first hurdle should be that people can provide a valid response when asked
about the issue.6 Therefore, I expect that the emotional frame will be easier and
will exhibit lower levels of item non-response as compared to the base or technical
frames.
Table 4.1 shows the basic distribution of attitudes on the three issues across
the three frame types. The frames are two-sided and intended to provide persuasive
reasons to both support or oppose the bill. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the
distribution of opinions across the three frames is mostly consistent. For limiting
foreign imports, there is no real substantive differences in the distribution of favor
or oppose responses. The fewest neutral responses do occur for the emotional cue,
but the differences between the percentage of neutral responses between the emo-
tional and technical cues is only 5%. For ICC participation, respondents are slightly
more favorable toward U.S. participation in the ICC if they get the base cue versus
either treatment. This seems to indicate that people support ICC participation in
6See Krosnick (1991) and chapter 3 for a discussion of the reasons why people give “don’t know”
responses.
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the abstract, but once given information about what the costs and benefits are of
participation, support decreases slightly. The effect, though, is not very big. Finally,
with regards to reinstitution of the gold standard, people are slightly more opposing
of the gold standard if they received the emotional cue. There is no real difference
between the base and technical cues. The lowest neutral percentage occurs for the
emotional cue. Overall, there are some deviations in the distribution of opinions
by frame types, especially in terms of the percentage of neutral responses for the




















































































































































































































The results of the item non-response analyses are presented in tables 4.2 and
4.3. As expected, table 4.2 shows, the lowest levels of item non-response for limiting
foreign imports is for the emotional cue (16%) followed by the base cue (20%) and
the highest non-response for the technical cue (29%). People have some sense of the
issue and most can respond when given no information as in the base cue, but they
are able to respond more when the cues prime groups and emotions for them. On
the other hand, when the issue is discussed in a more technical, policy way, people
are less able to respond to the issue.
Table 4.2: Percentage Item Non-response by Frame
Base Emotional Technical
Imports 20% 16% 29%
ICC 33% 32% 26%
Gold 40% 41% 38%
Source: 2009 CCES.
The story is not as clear for the other two issues, however. For ICC participa-
tion and reinstitution of the gold standard, the lowest levels of non-response actually
occur for the technical frame. Although the differences in “don’t know” percentages
across treatments are smaller for these two issues than for limiting foreign imports
(there is a 13 point gap for imports between the emotional and technical cues as
compared to 6 points for ICC and only 3 points for gold standard), the emotional
frames do not have the expected effect. For reinstitution of the gold standard, the
emotional frame actually has the highest non-response rate, and for ICC it is only
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1 percentage point lower than the base cue.
In line with Carmines’ and Stimson’s original idea of easy and hard issues, it
is important to test whether these framing effects work equally for all respondents,
or whether political sophistication conditions the effects of the frames. Table 4.3
shows the percentage of “don’t know” answers by treatment and sophistication
level. For limiting foreign imports, for all levels of sophistication, the technical
frame generates the highest non-response while the emotional frame generates the
lowest non-response. The effect is most pronounced for the highest sophistication
respondents, dropping 19 percentage points when receiving the emotional frame
versus the technical frame. For the middle sophistication group, it is a 15 percentage
point decrease in non-response, and 10 percentage points for the low sophistication
group. The emotional frame is easier for all levels of sophistication, but for the
lowest sophistication group, the emotional frame is not really any better than just
receiving the base cue. The emotional frame provides little extra help for the low
sophisticates, whereas it stimulates a much higher percentage of valid responses as
sophistication increases. The technical frame is clearly the hardest by this test, with
the non-response jumping for all three levels of sophistication.
Again, though, the findings do not match expectations for the ICC or gold
standard questions. The level of item non-response for each group is larger overall
than the non-response for limiting foreign imports, indicating that ICC is harder
than imports. For ICC, though, the highest “don’t know” percentages occur for
the base or emotional cues; the technical frame is always the lowest. Instead of the
technical frame making it harder for people to answer, it actually makes it easier
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Table 4.3: Percentage Item Non-response by Frame and Sophistication
Base Emotional Technical
Imports Low 25% 24% 34%
Medium 20 12 27
High 14 8 27
ICC Low 47% 45% 40%
Medium 25 29 21
High 20 20 15
Gold Low 51% 48% 41%
Medium 38 36 46
High 27 36 26
Source: 2009 CCES.
for people, regardless of their sophistication, as compared to the base or emotional
treatments. Yet although the lowest item non-response occurs for the technical
frame, there is still a clear conditioning effect of sophistication. The more highly
sophisticated have lower item non-response than the less sophisticated respondents,
as expected.
The gold standard question has the highest non-response of the three issues for
each group. More than 50% of the low sophistication people who received the base
cue said that they “don’t know/hadn’t thought much about it.” The non-response
by treatment, though, is all over the map. For the low sophistication people, the
base category yielded the highest non-response. For the middle group, the technical
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cue created the most non-response. For the high sophistication people, the emo-
tional cue actually generated the highest level of non-response. The emotional cue
was particularly hard for the high sophistication respondents, which is unexpected.
These people, who did the best for imports when receiving the emotional cue, actu-
ally are more ambivalent on whether or not to bring back the gold standard. The
conditioning effect of sophistication again holds, though, with the high sophistica-
tion people better able to respond to the question under any frame than those who
are less sophisticated.
Overall, the item non-response test follows expectations with regards to the
imports question both in relation to the expected sophistication and frame effects—
when people receive the emotional cue they are more likely to give a valid response
as compared to when they receive the technical cue, and people who are more
sophisticated are more likely to give a valid response regardless of frame as compared
to less sophisticated people. For ICC participation, though, the technical cue has
the lowest item-nonresponse, possibly indicating that the emotional cue is not that
easy. Although it is impossible to test the source of the hardness of the emotional cue
given these data, it may show that emotional prompts will not always make politics
easier for people. When there are two groups on opposing sides of the issue, but
both groups are supported (such as women and children versus American soldiers),
it can create more ambivalence because people cannot decide against one group or
the other. Who wants American soldiers to be harmed or women and children to
be slaughtered? Simply associating a policy with groups and putting an emotional
spin on the issue may not be enough to make it easy when there is a clear value or
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group trade-off. For reinstitution of the gold standard, the issue appears to stay just
too hard regardless of the cue. Even among the highest sophistication group, more
than one quarter of respondents fail to give a valid response regardless of the cue.
This could indicate that people have no clue what is going on when only given the
base cue, and cannot reasonably respond, and that even when given the emotional
cue, since popular groups are on both sides of the issues (hard-working Americans
and farmers), it is not made any easier.
In order to probe this effect further, I look at whether membership in the most
greatly affected group—labor unions—was driving these results. This may be im-
portant for determining who will give valid responses because this group attachment
in particular may increase awareness about this issue. Labor unions have a vested
interest in trade policy, and large labor unions, like the AFL-CIO, devote great at-
tention to this issue. On their website they have a whole section regarding the global
economy in which they present data and talking points on trade agreements, the
U.S. trade deficit, and more. In the case of labor unions, the frames may not only
be cuing feelings toward a particular group in society, but cuing people to think of
their own lives.7 To look at this relationship I used cross tabulation between union
7Possibly being a small business owner or CEO could be an additional group membership that
would drive people to feel themselves as directly effected by this policy, but there are not enough
of them in the sample to test this. There are enough labor union members, however, which is
the group commonly associated with the negative effects of increasing the flow of foreign goods
into the U.S. Additionally, there are no questions of group membership that are pertinent to ICC
participation or reinstitution of the gold standard, so this analysis cannot be completed for those
issues
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membership and non-response based on frame type, and a χ2 test of association
to determine whether they are statistically significantly related to each other. The
results are presented in tables 4.4-4.6.
Table 4.4: Percentage Item Non-response on Limiting Foreign Imports by Union
Membership and Frame for Low Sophistication
Non-Union Union Member
Base Valid 71% 89% 75%
DK 29 11 25
100 100 100
χ2 = 4.54, p < .033
Emotional Valid 75% 79% 76%
DK 25 21 24
100 100 100
χ2 = .262, p < .609
Technical Valid 63% 76% 66%
DK 37 24 34
100 100 100
χ2 = 1.36, p < .244
Source: 2009 CCES.
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Union membership is only statistically significantly related to whether respon-
dents provided a valid response for limiting foreign imports among the low sophis-
tication group. For medium or high sophistication respondents, union membership
has no statistically significant effects (although the relationship goes in the expected
direction with union members providing more valid responses). For the low knowl-
edge group, union members only had an 18% non-response rate as compared to
30% for non-union respondents. For the middle sophistication group this differ-
ence is smaller—17% for union members and 21% for non-union people. For the
high sophistication group, there is little difference with union members having 14%
non-response and non-union people with 18%.8
4.6 Looking at the Interaction of Sophistication,
Frames, and Predispositions
In order to assess to what extent core values and group affect are actually
being activated by the emotional cues, I ran a series of multinomial logit models.9
8I also looked as this relationship broken down by frame type. This relationship is true for the
base condition (for the lowest sophistication group union membership is statistically significantly
related to whether the respondents said they “don’t know”), but not for the emotional or technical
frames. For these other two frames, union membership is not statistically significant for any of the
three levels of sophistication.
9I collapsed favor and strongly favor, and oppose and strongly oppose together. I ran many of
the models using ordered logit with the full five-category dependent variable, and the results were
basically the same. For simplicity of presenting the results, therefore, I use multinomial logit so
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Table 4.5: Percentage Item Non-response on Limiting Foreign Imports by Union
Membership and Frame for Medium Sophistication
Non-Union Union Member
Base Valid 80% 81% 80%
DK 20 19 20
100 100 100
χ2 = .022, p < .882
Emotional Valid 85% 95% 88%
DK 15 5 12
100 100 100
χ2 = 2.60, p < .107
Technical Valid 73% 74% 73%
DK 27 26 27
100 100 100
χ2 = .002, p < .960
Source: 2009 CCES.
In these models, the treatments (emotional or technical frames) are interacted with
respondent level of sophistication and the relevant core value or group affect ques-
that I show three predicted probabilities.
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Table 4.6: Percentage Item Non-response on Limiting Foreign Imports by Union
Membership and Frame for High Sophistication
Non-Union Union Member
Base Valid 86% 86% 86%
DK 14 14 14
100 100 100
χ2 = .010, p < .921
Emotional Valid 91% 94% 92%
DK 9 6 8
100 100 100
χ2 = .200, p < .655
Technical Valid 72% 74% 72%
DK 28 26 28
100 100 100
χ2 = .038, p < .846
Source: 2009 CCES.
tion for each issue. This three-way interaction allows me to examine whether the
frames affect people’s attitudes on foreign imports, ICC participation, or the gold
standard, and whether the affect of the frames is conditioned by the respondent’s
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level of sophistication and predispositions. I am extending the previous literature
by looking at how attaching core values or predispositions to issue easiness is not
homogenous with respect to frames. Low sophistication respondents will be trig-
gered by emotional cues and use their core values to understand issues. For high
sophistication people, however, they may understand which kinds of political groups
support issues, and they are aware if their own predispositions, so they can rely on
party identification or another “higher level” heuristic to make their determination.
There is a nuance to the way that people will use predispositions—I expect that
lower sophistication respondents will do better given the emotional frame, and bet-
ter be able to use their values, whereas higher sophistication people may use another
type of predisposition, such as party identification.
The multinomial logit results for patriotism are presented in the appendix.10
To gauge the substantive significance of the results, I generated predicted probabil-
ities that are presented in tables 4.7 and 4.8.11
As the predicted probabilities for limiting foreign imports show, for the least
sophisticated group, patriotism does not really help people decide on limits on im-
10l do not discuss the coefficients because this is a fully interactive multinomial logit model.
In the case of non-interactive (“normal”) logit, only the statistical significance and sign can be
interpreted anyway because the changes in the coefficients are changes in the log odds ratios. Since
this model includes interaction terms, even the significance is useless (Ai and Norton 2003).
11The confidence intervals are not presented for the predicted probabilities because they always
overlap. The confidence intervals are quite large and none of the differences are statistically
significant, so they do not aid in understanding which results are significant. This is probably due
to the small sample size for each category.
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ports if they get the base cue.12 For these people, there is a 50% chance of providing
a neutral response and only a 49% chance of favoring limits on foreign imports, even
though they are highly patriotic. Once the low sophistication respondents are given
the emotional cue, however, the probability of favoring new limits on imports in-
creases to 71%. Once the low sophistication people are given the technical cue, the
probability of favoring limits further increases to 82%. Patriotism clearly relates
to low sophistication respondents’ attitudes on import limits when they are given
frames for understanding the issue, and it does not actually matter whether the
frame is specifically intended to bring about a more emotional response—either cue
helps them connect their patriotism to their attitudes. For low sophisticated respon-
dents that are not very patriotic, patriotism does not help them to form attitudes
on imports, regardless of the cues provided. This result makes sense since I do not
expect that a lack of patriotism (the absence of having some value) would influence
attitudes on the issue.
Among the high sophistication respondents, patriotism does not seem to help
them much in developing their attitudes. When a high sophistication, high patriotic
person receives the base cue, they have a 52% chance of favoring limits on imports
as compared to 38% of the same people who are low on patriotism. The effect of
12The low sophistication group is computed as the mean for the sophistication variable minus one
standard deviation, and high sophistication is computed as the mean plus one standard deviation.
Low and high patriotism are computed the same way—low patriotism is the mean value of the
patriotism index minus one standard deviation and high patriotism is the mean value plus one
standard deviation.
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patriotism on attitudes on imports actually decreases for the high sophistication
people when they are given the emotional or technical cues. For the emotional
or technical cues, the probability of a high sophistication, highly patriotic person
favoring limits on imports is only 44%. High sophistication do not attach their pa-
triotism to their attitudes on imports, and when cued in ways that might seemingly
heighten the influence of their patriotism, the cues actually dampen any real effect
of patriotism. For the low sophistication people, though, patriotism matters a lot
for their attitudes on imports when they are cued for it to matter.
The results for ICC show basically the opposite effect based on sophistication.
For ICC participation, the highly sophisticated respondents connect their patriotism
pretty clearly to their attitudes. If a person is high sophistication, low patriotism and
received the base cue, they have a 72% chance of favoring ICC participation. If the
same group is highly patriotic, they have an 87% chance of opposing participation
in the ICC. Although the cues dampen this effect slightly (for example, if a person
received the emotional cue, the probability of opposing participation if a person is
high sophistication and highly patriotic drops to 78% and favoring participation if
low patriotism drops to 82%), the relationship between patriotism and attitudes on
ICC participation is clear and in the expected direction. It is interesting to reflect,
though, that the cues do not really help the high sophistication respondents realize














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The relationship between low sophistication respondents’ attitudes on ICC
participation and patriotism is less clear. When low sophistication respondents
receive the base cue, they have a higher probability of favoring ICC participation
whether they are low or high on patriotism. Regardless of their patriotism, they
want to participate in the ICC. There is some small cue movement, though, for the
low sophistication group. Once they get the emotional cue, the low patriotism people
favor ICC participation at 45% as compared to the high patriotism people who only
have a 32% probability of favoring participation. The technical cue is even better
with a 56% chance of low sophistication, low patriotism people favoring participation
as compared to only 27% of highly patriotic people favoring participation. The
relationship is going in the right direction, but, the effect of patriotism is not as
big as for high sophistication respondents. On the other hand, the cues do help the
low sophistication respondents some (even though it does not make the connection
between patriotism and ICC participation attitudes anywhere near that of the high
sophistication people), whereas for the high sophistication group, the cues do not
matter. The high sophistication respondents know to connect their patriotism to





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Now, turning to partisanship, the “unmoved mover,” I examine whether parti-
sanship influences people’s issue positions, even though there is nothing specifically
partisan in the frame. Possibly more sophisticated respondents are able to use the
partisanship to understand the issues by inferring which groups or values line up
with which party. Especially because there is nothing explicitly partisan in the
frames, I expect that low sophistication respondents will not use their partisanship
to understand these issues, while high sophistication respondents may be able to do
so. The party identification predicted probabilities are presented in tables 4.9-4.11
(the multinomial logit results are found in the appendix in tables 4.14-4.16).
In table 4.9, we see that a majority of low sophistication respondents always
want to limit foreign imports, regardless of treatment or partisanship. The emotional
cue, rather than dividing these people, actually makes people from both parties equal
in their probability of favoring new limits on imports. Based on my understanding
of how each party should feel about limits on foreign imports (Clinton excluded, but
groups associated with the Democratic Party, such as labor unions), I expect that
the Democrats would in fact favor new limits. The low sophistication Democrats
appear to pick up on this. However, the low sophistication Republicans do not pick
up on their party’s cues for this issue. In fairness to the Republicans here, these cues
do not explicitly cue partisanship, so they will not necessarily grab onto it based
on these cues. The low sophistication Democrats, though, do. Surprisingly, though,
the high sophistication Democrats do not attach their partisanship to this issue as
clearly as the low sophistication Democrats. When given the emotional or technical
cues, high sophistication Democrats increase their support for limits on imports.
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However, their support for limits is lower than the low sophistication Democrats for
each cue (55% compared to 58% for the technical cue, 51% compared to 69% for the
emotional cue, and 38% compared to 55% for the base cue). This issue appears to be
more partisan for Democrats, but especially for the low sophistication Democrats.
For ICC participation, as we see in table 4.10, the effect of partisanship is huge,
particularly for the high sophistication respondents. Somehow, people are able to
connect their partisanship to their attitudes on ICC participation intuitively, even
though there are no partisan frames given explicitly and this issue has not been
framed recently (if ever) by the parties. Among the high sophistication people,
Democrats overwhelmingly support ICC participation and Republicans overwhelm-
ingly oppose, regardless of treatment. For the high sophisticates, the treatment
does not really matter at all. For low sophisticates, the treatments do not allow
them to be as polarized as the high sophisticates, but the pattern follows the same
general direction as the high sophisticates for the emotional or technical cues. It
is interesting to note, though, that low sophistication Democrats seem to under-
stand this issue best when given the base cue, and the fall off in their support
for ICC participation when given either cue, whereas low sophistication Republi-
cans are more mixed given the base cue, and then become more opposing of ICC
participation under either treatment. I cannot test why this is true, but my best
conjecture is that this is because of the groups and rationales associated with the
frames. In the current pro-American, pro-soldier climate (hate the wars, love the
soldiers), Democrats like the sound of supporting ICC participation. However, when
they have to choose against American sovereignty, or against our men and women
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in uniform, it becomes harder for them to be so resolute in their beliefs about ICC
participation. For Republicans, although they probably do not want genocide or
the murders of women and children either, they are not cross-pressured in the same
way that Democrats are. These rationales are just not as salient to them in the U.S.
context as supporting the troops.
Finally, in table 4.11, we see that Republican identification helps respondents
understand whether the U.S. should reinstitute the gold standard, but Democrats
(especially low sophistication ones) have a harder time with this issue. Highly
sophisticated Democrats and Republicans are able to determine whether they favor
or oppose this policy. Strong Democrats have a 53% chance of opposing reinstitution
of the gold standard under the base cue while Strong Republicans have a 69% chance
of favoring the gold standard. When given the emotional cue, Strong Democrats
become even less supportive of the gold standard with a 62% chance of saying
they oppose reinstitution of the gold standard. Strong Republicans, on the other
hand, actually have their support for the gold standard dampened with a 57%
chance of favoring the gold standard. Finally, highly sophisticated Republicans
under the technical cue maintain a probability of supporting the gold standard of
66%. Democrats, though, are divided under the technical cue. This is even worse
among the low sophistication Democrats. When given the technical cue, there is
a 50% chance of a neutral response. Strong Republicans, however, even though
they are low sophistication, have a 63-66% chance of favoring the gold standard,
regardless of the frame.
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Partisanship overall plays a big role in helping shape people’s political atti-
tudes. Although this sounds like a truly obvious statement, it is somewhat surprising
in this context. These issues for the most part have not been cued by either one of
the parties recently. Yet, people can still attach their party identification to these
issues. This is especially surprising in the case of low sophistication respondents,
who actually get the biggest boost of all for limiting foreign imports. Possibly this
is because the groups or rationales associated with these policies serve as proxies for























































































































































































































































































































































4.7 Easy Issues Are Easy Arguments
Throughout this chapter, I presented evidence from experiments designed to
test whether “hard” issues that are not long on the political agenda or generally
discussed in symbolic terms could be made easier through the use of “easy” frames.
In the end, it seems that frames can move people on these issues. However, the
results are not simply that all people can be moved by frames, or that group-based
emotional frames will always be easier. The frames that were designed to be easy,
that played on emotions, groups, and core values were not always easiest. In the
case of ICC participation, the emotional cues ended up being harder for people,
especially Democrats. Possibly, this is because two-sided cues that have compelling
arguments on both sides can be hard, even if the content is designed to be emotional
and intuitive. Simply attaching groups or values to an issue will not necessarily make
the issue easier if the public supports people on both sides of the issue. In fact, this
may lead to greater ambivalence among the public, which we see some evidence of
here.
The emotional cues did not always help less sophisticated respondents as com-
pared to the technical frames, either. In several cases, less sophisticated respondents
were able to make use of both cues, even though the technical cue was designed to
discuss the problems with a policy’s implementation. In the case of limiting imports,
less sophisticated respondents pretty consistently attached their values or partisan-
ship to the issue given either the technical or emotional frame, while the highly
sophisticated respondents failed to do so. Yet, the less sophisticated respondents
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clearly had more trouble giving a valid answer to the questions than the highly
sophisticated respondents. Possibly, less sophisticated respondents do care less and
are more likely to give a response to technical issues, but when they do so, they do
so with more fervor than their highly sophisticated counterparts. This may indi-
cate that, although it is hard to engage these less sophisticated people, once they






– Base: Some people favor placing new limits on foreign imports. Other
people oppose such limits. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on
imports, or haven’t you thought much about this?
– Emotional: Some people favor placing new limits on foreign imports be-
cause they worry that imported goods take jobs away from hard-working
Americans. Other people oppose new limits because they worry that lim-
iting free trade makes it harder for hard-working Americans to buy things
at a fair price. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or
haven’t you thought much about this?
– Technical: Some people favor placing new limits on foreign imports
because they believe there are currently problems with regulating tariff
rates and customs standards. Other people oppose such limits because
they believe that determining the quota and licensing for imports is dif-
ficult. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven’t
you thought much about this?
Participation in the ICC
– Base: The International Criminal Court is a court established to help
prosecute crimes that concern the international community. Some people
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favor U.S. cooperation with the International Criminal Court. Others
oppose U.S. cooperation. Do you favor or oppose U.S. involvement, or
haven’t you thought much about this?
– Emotional: The International Criminal Court is a court established to
help prosecute crimes that concern the international community. Some
people favor U.S. cooperation with in the International Criminal Court
because they are angry about mass murders or violent crimes against
women and children. Others oppose U.S. cooperation because they are
angry that American citizens and soldiers may be tried overseas by for-
eigners. Do you favor or oppose U.S. involvement, or haven’t you thought
much about this?
– Technical: The International Criminal Court is a court established to
help prosecute crimes that concern the international community. Some
people favor U.S. cooperation with the International Criminal Court be-
cause they believe stronger international courts will enforce a global stan-
dard of just behavior. Others oppose U.S. cooperation because they do
not agree with the idea of the U.S. yielding its independence to an inter-
national body. Do you favor or oppose U.S. involvement, or haven’t you
thought much about this?
Reinstitution of the Gold Standard
– Base: Currently the value of U.S. dollars adjusts based on supply and
demand. Some people favor returning to the gold standard where the
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value of dollars is based on gold. Others oppose this switch and support
the current floating currency system. Do you favor or oppose returning
to the gold standard, or haven’t you thought much about this?
– Emotional: Currently the value of U.S. dollars adjusts based on supply
and demand. Some people favor returning to the gold standard where the
value of dollars is based on gold because they are afraid that the current
system may produce rising prices and leave hard-working Americans and
small business people unable to pay their bills. Others oppose this switch
and support the current floating currency system because they are afraid
the switch may decrease the supply of money, leading to job losses for
hard-working Americans and making it harder for farmers to get good
prices for their crops. Do you favor or oppose returning to the gold
standard, or haven’t you thought much about this?
– Technical: Currently the value of U.S. dollars adjusts based on supply
and demand. Some people favor returning to the gold standard where
the value of dollars is based on gold because they believe that it increases
currency stability and decreases market losses. Others oppose this switch
and support the current floating currency system because they believe the
gold standard increases the risk of exchange losses and price instability.
Do you favor or oppose returning to the gold standard, or haven’t you








7. Haven’t thought much about this/don’t know
4.8.2 Feeling Thermometers
We’d like to get your feelings toward some groups. Please rate the following
groups on something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees
and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings
between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t care much for that group.
Ratings of 50 mean that you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.
• Working-class people









• How important is being American to you, where 0 is not at all important and
10 is the most important thing in your life? (Respondents answered by sliding
a widget on a scale from 0 to 10.)
• How strongly do you agree or disagree with this statement: “The world would
be better if more people from other countries were like Americans.” (Response
options 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with
“don’t know/haven’t thought much about this” offered as an answer).
• How strongly do you agree or disagree with this statement: “People who
do not wholeheartedly support America should live elsewhere.” (Response
options 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with
“don’t know/haven’t thought much about this” offered as an answer).
4.8.4 Isolationism
• How strongly do you agree or disagree with this statement: “This country
would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves
with problems in other parts of the world.” (Response options 5-point scale
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with “don’t know/haven’t
thought much about this” offered as an answer).
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4.9 Appendix Tables
Table 4.12: Multinomial Logit for Treatments, Sophistication, and Patriotism on Attitudes on
Limiting Foreign Imports
Emotional vs. Base Technical vs. Base
Favor vs. Oppose vs. Favor vs. Favor vs. Oppose vs. Favor vs.
Neutral Neutral Oppose Neutral Neutral Oppose
Sophistication -1.639 -1.065 0.574 -1.639 -1.065 0.574
(1.342) (1.584) (1.501) (1.342) (1.584) (1.501)
Treatment -2.353 -3.223 -0.870 -2.449 0.00773 2.457
(1.407) (1.735) (1.584) (1.563) (1.858) (1.794)
Patriotism -0.706 -5.865∗∗ -5.159∗∗ -0.706 -5.865∗∗ -5.159∗∗
(1.410) (2.106) (1.962) (1.410) (2.106) (1.962)
Sophistication X Treatment 4.197∗ 5.687∗ 1.490 4.109 0.523 -3.586
(2.106) (2.432) (2.180) (2.236) (2.578) (2.438)
Patriotism X Treatment 5.508∗ 7.372∗ 1.865 3.473 -1.211 -4.684
(2.265) (3.070) (2.780) (2.471) (3.468) (3.325)
Patriotism X Sophistication 3.671 9.365∗∗ 5.694∗ 3.671 9.365∗∗ 5.694∗
(2.257) (3.006) (2.731) (2.257) (3.006) (2.731)
Patriotism X Treatment X Sophistication -9.843∗∗ -12.59∗∗ -2.751 -6.689 -0.0622 6.626
(3.539) (4.381) (3.875) (3.770) (4.851) (4.484)
Constant 1.116 0.677 -0.439 1.116 0.677 -0.439
(.917) (1.149) (1.068) (1.22) (1.149) (1.068)
N 558 490





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“Easy Issue” Experiment: The
Case of Abortion
5.1 Why Abortion
Every year on the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision, tens of thousands
of activists descend upon Washington, D.C. to voice their opinions on abortion.
People march with signs showing slogans like “she’s not a choice: she’s a child”
and “keep your laws off my body.” People from all walks of life are among the
protestors. This probably includes people who know relatively little about politics
and would be grouped in the low or middle knowledge categories. Yet they respond
with such fervor on this issue. Abortion has become one of the most controversial
issues in contemporary American politics (Alvarez and Brehm 1995). It generates
intense emotional reactions from the public and garners substantial attention from
government officials, activists, and interest groups (Carmines and Stimson 1989,
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Carsey and Layman 2006). Abortion is a unique issue because it is so emotional
and bitter, and there is no middle ground as one side sees an unborn child and
the other sees a fetus. It is a polarizing issue that divides the public. As a result,
abortion is often credited as being a classic “easy” issue.
Although abortion has been debated since the written record, going back to
ancient Greek times, Luker (1985) argues that abortion has become so important in
recent decades in the U.S. for a two reasons—the status of the fetus and the status
of women have both changed. First, technology has made it possible to track the
development of human life like never before. A hundred years ago, women could
not confirm their pregnancies until they were months into it, and even then they
could not track every development occurring inside them. “Quickening,” or when
the mother could feel the baby move, was often when pregnancy was confirmed.
Since there was limited information about what was occurring inside a woman’s
body, drugs or procedures to “restore menses” were not really viewed as “abortions.”
Second, the status of women has also changed. Women now are part of the workforce
and able to control their reproduction in previously unimaginable ways. Abortion is
symbolic of broader, deeper debates about world views. It is representative of larger
debates over the role of women in society, the meaning of parenthood, sexuality, and
gender equality (Luker 1985, Jelen 1988, 1-9).
Abortion has become so visceral and symbolic that debates over other issues,
like the federal budget and national healthcare, become about abortion for some
people. In 2009, the massive healthcare overhaul bill sought by President Obama
became focused on abortion. Since the vote in Congress was close, several con-
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gressmen’s anti-abortion beliefs took center stage in the national healthcare debate.
Representative Stupak, for example, led a contingent of anti-abortion Democrats in
the House of Representatives and refused to vote for the bill until he was promised
that an executive order would be issued to back the ban on the use of government
money to pay for abortions. Although the healthcare bill was nearly 2,000 pages
long, and included provisions about pre-existing conditions, age limits for dependent
coverage, yearly and lifetime payout caps, co-pays for preventative screenings, and
dozens of other things, the possibility that federal money might potentially be used
for abortions nearly prevented this bill from passing. Abortion is such a powerful
symbol for some that virtually any issue can be overcome by abortion attitudes.
Beyond descriptive evidence about abortion, previous research has shown that
people’s attitudes on abortion are more stable and constrained than attitudes on
many other political issues (Converse and Markus 1979, Zaller 1992). Abortion at-
titudes are more resilient to question ordering or other “carryover effects” (Zaller
1992, 78). Relatively speaking, since we know that most people fail to have “so-
lidified” political beliefs, attitudes on abortion seem crystallized; since abortion is
such a personal issue, it should not be surprising that we expect people’s attitudes
will be more stable (Adams 1997, 729). We also know that partisan differences
have come to define abortion, with Democrats taking a more pro-choice stance and
Republicans taking a pro-life position (Adams 1997).
Going back to chapter 3, I present further evidence that abortion is unique
as an issue. The percentage of item non-response on abortion is consistently low
in every year. This preliminary analysis further supports the idea that abortion is
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somehow “easier” for respondents than a variety of other issues. Respondents, even
those with less political sophistication or education, are able to provide an answer on
abortion whereas on other issues, such as “limiting foreign imports” there is a very
high percentage of item non-response.1 This also highlights several key elements
of easy issues as described by Carmines and Stimson. Abortion has been long on
the agenda and mostly deals with policy ends rather than policy means. This,
coupled with other research which has shown that people’s abortion attitudes are
more fully-formed than their attitudes on other issues, makes abortion a potentially
enlightening case for the study of “easy” issues.
As I have discussed throughout the dissertation, though, there is reason to
expect that issues are not inherently easy and that political context is critical in
determining which issues are easy for the public. Therefore, I employ several survey
experiments to examine abortion’s status as an easy issue. Based on public opinion
research that demonstrates people have non-crystallized beliefs on most political
issues, and their attitudes are often influenced by survey artifacts like how a question
is asked, I test whether or not question-wording changes influence people’s abortion
attitudes. I argue that if something really is “easy” for voters, the way the question
is asked should have little influence on their professed opinions. More specifically,
changing the style of the response options or the wording of the question should not
change people’s attitudes on abortion if it is truly “easy.”
1Item non-response can also be influenced by a variety of other factors—ordering of the ques-
tions, length of the survey, available response options, etc. However, this finding holds over time
in the NES and is consistent with other research on abortion attitudes.
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5.2 Abortion Attitudes in the 2008 NES
The 2008 NES includes a survey experiment that allows me to test the effect of
altering the way people are asked to report their abortion attitudes on their professed
opinions. Approximately half of the sample received the traditional NES abortion
question: “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years.
Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?” Respondents
are then given four response options (see the appendix for the specific response
option wording). The other half of the sample received a series of new questions
about abortion that were asked in the General Social Survey (GSS) previously.
These new questions have two important differences from the old question. First,
respondents were asked about seven different scenarios under which a woman might
be allowed to have an abortion (potential death of mother, other non-fatal health-
risk for mother, birth defect, financial hardship, rape, incest, and baby is wrong
gender) rather than being asked one question about abortion that has some of these
scenarios as part of the response options. Second, the new questions were asked
in a branching-format in which they were first asked whether they favor, oppose,
neither favor nor oppose permitting abortion under a given scenario, and then were
asked a series of follow-up questions about how much they favored/opposed (see the
appendix for the full questions).
For these analyses, the old (or control) version of the abortion question was
used as-is because it is one question that has four response options which encompass
specific instances in which abortion might be permissible. I used factor analysis by
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iterated principal factor to create a single measure from the new (or experimental)
version questions to generate a measure of abortion similar to the original version.
The results of the factor analysis are presented in table 5.1.2 The factor score was
ranged from 0 to 1.
Since I expect that the level of sophistication has a conditioning effect on abor-
tion attitudes’ influence on vote choice, I estimated an interactive model between
level of sophistication and abortion attitudes. The sophistication measure is com-
prised of 9 objective knowledge questions and education.3 I created an index score
of education and factual knowledge and ranged it from 0 to 1.
2The abortion when baby is wrong gender question was omitted as it did not load on the same
factor as the other questions. There is other evidence that the respondents view allowing abortion
because the baby is the “wrong” gender to be outside of the scope of how they generally think of
abortion. More than 76% of the sample strongly opposed abortion in this case, which does not
look anything like the distribution of opinion on any of the other abortion questions.
3The knowledge items include whether the respondent knew: which party was in the House ma-
jority, which party was in the Senate majority, whether the Democratic Party or Republican Party
is more conservative, whether Obama or McCain is more conservative, whether Obama or Bush is
more conservative, the party affiliation of their Governor, 2 Senators, and House Representative.
140
Table 5.1: Factor Analysis of Experimental Abortion Questions in the 2008 NES







Eigenvalue 2.86 (85% of the total variance)
Notes: Factors are retained using iterated principal factors method.
Source: 2008 NES.
In accordance with the traditional Carmines and Stimson test for easy issues,
I begin with a model to predict vote choice based on abortion attitudes.4 They
emphasize this model because of the normative implications. If people can issue
vote on easy issues, they are fulfilling their duties as a democratic citizen, even if
4Carmines and Stimson (1980) do not actually predict vote choice but rather look at the per-
centage of people who voted for McGovern.
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they fail to understand more technical, complex issues. If abortion is hard, then the
connection between people’s abortion attitudes and the vote should be conditioned
by level of sophistication, as only more knowledgeable people can connect the issue
with their vote choice. If, however, the connection to the vote is the same for
everyone, then it is an easy issue.
Probit models were estimated for both the control and experimental versions of
the abortion question. The coefficient estimates are presented in appendix figures 5.4
and 5.5. In both the older and newer version, knowledge level and abortion attitudes
themselves are not statistically significant, but the interaction term between the two
is highly statistically significant.
Since it is easier and more substantive to interpret predicted probabilities,
I created figures 5.1 and 5.2 that show the conditioning effect of sophistication
on abortion attitudes influence on vote choice.5 For the low sophistication group,
abortion is not attached to their vote choice at all. Regardless of whether they
profess to be pro-life or pro-choice, their probability of voting for Obama remains the
same. The effect of abortion attitudes on vote choice for the medium sophistication
group shows that there is some connection between abortion attitudes and vote
choice, as they get more pro-life they become less likely to vote for Obama. Finally,
the effect of abortion attitudes on vote choice is very clear for the high sophistication
group. Among these respondents, the pro-choice respondents have roughly an 80%
probability of voting for Obama, whereas the most pro-life respondents have roughly




Figure 5.1: Probability of Voting for Obama by Abortion Attitudes and Sophistica-
tion, Old Version
Based on this test, abortion appears to be a hard issue, as connection to the
vote is conditioned by level of sophistication like the case of the Vietnam War in
Carmines and Stimson. When I replicated the same model in figure 5.2 with the
new abortion questions, the relationship remains the same between the old and new
versions, indicating that people are relatively stable in their abortion preferences
and that it does not matter how the question is asked or whether the response
options branch—connection to the vote is the same.
This begs the question why is there such a disconnect between apparently
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Figure 5.2: Probability of Voting for Obama by Abortion Attitudes and Sophistica-
tion, New Version
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(relatively) firm attitudes on abortion and a lack of issue voting on this issue? Two
answers are plausible: either low sophistication people care less about abortion as an
issue and therefore do not vote on it (salience hypothesis); or they do not know how
the candidates stand on abortion and cannot match their preferences with political
alternatives (candidate placement hypothesis). I test both of these hypotheses using
contingency tables with chi-square tests of statistical significance.
A preliminary test of the salience hypothesis was presented in chapter 3. I
found that almost no one lists abortion as the most important issue when they can
pick any issue. Instead, people focus on issues like foreign policy and the economy.
However, the NES does provide another way to test the role of salience. There
is an abortion specific salience question that asks “How important is this issue
[abortion] to you personally?” Respondents are given 5 choices ranging from “not
at all important” to “extremely important.” Table 5.2 shows the results of abortion
salience across level of political sophistication for the old version of the abortion
question.6 There are no significant differences in the importance of abortion as
an issue between the 3 levels of political sophistication; high, medium, and low
sophistication respondents all give the same ratings of abortion importance. This
indicates that the salience hypothesis is not supported; lower levels of abortion
salience are not responsible for the disconnect between abortion attitudes and vote
choice seen among lower sophistication respondents.
6The new abortion questions do not include a measure of importance of the issue.
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Table 5.2: Relationship Between the Salience of Abortion Issue and the Level of
Sophistication
Level of Sophistication
Importance of Abortion Issue Low Medium High
Not at all important 5.85 5 3.37
Not too important 7.71 9.71 7.98
Somewhat important 32.71 30.29 37.73
Very important 34.04 37.65 33.44
Extremely important 19.68 17.35 17.48
Total 100 100 100
χ2(df): 7.78 (8), p < .456
Source: 2008 NES
Notes: Cell entries are column percentages.
The second hypothesis, that less sophisticated people do not know how can-
didates stand on abortion, is tested using the candidate placement questions. Re-
spondents were asked to place Obama and McCain on the same abortion scales they
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received. If the respondent received the old version of the abortion question, s/he
was asked to determine the abortion attitudes of McCain and Obama by picking
their abortion attitudes on the same scale. If the respondent received the new ver-
sion of the abortion questions, s/he was asked to place McCain and Obama on the
same scale for the wrong gender and non-fatal health risk questions. I used these
questions to determine if the respondents knew which candidate is more pro-choice
and which is more pro-life. As long as the respondents placed McCain at a position
on the scale more pro-life than the one at which they placed Obama, the respondent
gave a “correct” answer. Tables 5.3 (control version) and 5.4 (experimental version)
show the results of the second hypothesis, and demonstrate that political sophis-
tication matters for whether people got the candidate placement correct. For the
old version, the low sophisticated respondents only placed the candidates correctly
45% of the time, whereas 66% of the middle sophistication, and 85% of the high
sophistication groups correctly placed the candidates on abortion. Most of the lower
knowledge respondents do not know where the candidates stand on abortion.
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Table 5.3: Relationship Between Candidate Placement on Abortion Issue (Control)
and Level of Sophistication
Level of Sophistication
Candidate Placement on Abortion Low Medium High
Wrong 54.90 33.33 14.09
Correct 45.10 66.67 85.91
Total 100 100 100
χ2(df): 102.06 (2), p<.0001
Notes: Cell entries are column percentages
Source: 2008 NES.
Table 5.4 shows that political sophistication matters for candidate placement
for the experimental questions too. Overall, respondents across all levels of sophisti-
cation were less likely to correctly place the candidates using the new questions than
the old questions, but sophistication conditions the results in the same way. Among
the low sophistication group, only 16% correctly place the candidates, whereas 35%
of the middle sophistication group and 65% of the high sophistication group know
where the candidates stand on abortion.
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Table 5.4: Relationship Between Candidate Placement on Abortion Issue (Experi-
mental) and Level of Sophistication
Level of Sophistication
Candidate Placement on Abortion Low Medium High
Wrong 83.18 64.81 34.65
Correct 16.82 35.19 65.35
Total 100 100 100
χ2(df): 58.65 (2), p<.0001
Notes: Cell entries are column percentages
Source: 2008 NES.
5.3 Easy/Hard Frames and Abortion Attitudes
The NES experiment allowed me to test whether question format and response
options made a difference in abortion attitudes and its impact on vote choice across
political sophistication. Now, I further look at abortion “easiness” with an exper-
imental data sample from the 2008 CCES in which I vary the frames for abortion
to test whether people are persuaded from their opinions on abortion. Respondents
were randomly assigned to one of nine treatment groups. For analysis and present-
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ing the results, several of the treatment groups were collapsed together because the
results were similar, and theoretically, these treatments all work in similar ways.
More details are presented on this during the results write-up and in the appendix.
This experiment allows me to isolate the effect of the question wording on
responses about abortion. There were no statistically significant differences across
the treatment groups based on party identification, income, age, sex, region, or
education, meaning that the typical controls are not needed.7 The control group
received a question without any supportive cues. It was worded as: “Some people
think women should be allowed to have an abortion. Other people think abortion
should be banned. Which of the following opinions comes closest to your view on
abortion, or haven’t you thought much about this?”
From this base treatment, other cues were added to produce different treat-
ments. These included one sided cues (providing only a pro-life rationale or a pro-
choice rationale) and “neutral” cues that were designed to direct the respondents
toward a more neutral perspective on abortion. The neutral cues explained that
some people are in the middle on abortion and do not know what to think, that
they are mixed on abortion depending upon different circumstances. The full ques-
tion wording for each treatment group is presented in the appendix. For clarity in
presenting the results, several of the treatment categories were collapsed to yield 4
7Again, in order to test whether the random assignment worked, I conducted Tukey Honestly
Significant in Difference Tests for party identification, ideology, age, education, income, gender,
and race. The control and treatment groups are not statistically significantly different from each
other, so randomization is achieved.
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treatments (please see the appendix for this). I considered many types of cues for
this study, and selected these cues as a preliminary test of what cues can influence
abortion attitudes. There were many different possibilities for framing abortion, but
I chose this subset based on my theoretical understanding of easy issues at the time.
That is, issue easiness should be related to people’s gut-level reaction, so I wanted to
test whether people could be shook from their gut responses on abortion. Therefore,
I used one-sided cues that only provided a rationale for one side of the debate to
see if people would leave their positions and join the side which was supported in
the frames, and neutral cues that were designed to make abortion harder by cuing
for ambivalence or neutrality.
Preliminary tests of the CCES indicate some support for abortion easiness.
Abortion attitudes are correlated at .85 from the pre-election survey to the post-
election survey.8. When the four category scale is collapsed into two categories, “pro-
choice” and “pro-life,” the correlation decreases to .77. This indicates two things
about abortion attitudes in this sample. First, abortion attitudes are relatively
highly constrained over time, despite the experimental treatments. Responses on
the abortion question were fairly consistent from the first survey to the second
one. Second, since the correlation decreases once the “pro-life” and “pro-choice”
responses were collapsed, it further indicates that people are switching between
positions two and three. That is, even among people who were not constrained
over time, many of them switched between positions two (allow only in the case of
8Respondents on the pre-election survey were only given the standard abortion question without
any experimental treatments.
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rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life) and three (allow in cases other than
rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only when a clear need has been
established). Most people are not flipping from always allow to never allow, but
instead are changing between the two middle, less polarized positions.
I further analyze the CCES data by estimating an ordered logit model for
abortion attitudes across the treatments and level of political knowledge. We want
to assess whether abortion attitudes are malleable based on different frames respon-
dents received on the abortion question, and whether this effect is conditioned by
level of political sophistication. If abortion attitudes are the same, regardless of the
framing, it supports the idea that abortion is an easy issue. If the framing effects are
great, it supports the idea that abortion is a hard issue and people do not have so-
lidified attitudes on abortion. It is especially pertinent, considering what Carmines
and Stimson tell us about testing for easy issues, to see if the framing effects are
stronger for lower sophistication respondents than higher ones.
The coefficient estimates are presented in the appendix in figure 3. Predicted
probabilities were generated to assess the substantive significance of the treatments
and their interaction with political knowledge on abortion attitudes. Figure 5 shows
the predicted probability of responding “always allow” abortion across level of po-
litical sophistication by treatment.
Among respondents in the control group, those who are more knowledgeable
are slightly more likely to respond “always allow” abortion than those with lower
levels of knowledge. The conditioning effect, however, is minimal. Among respon-
dents who received the rights only cue, the probability of responding “always allow”
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Figure 5.3: Probability of Always Allow Abortion by Treatments and Knowledge
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is much higher as compared to the control group across all levels of sophistication.
The conditioning effect of sophistication is minimal—if a respondent received the
rights only cue, s/he is much more likely to give a more pro-choice response regard-
less of sophistication. The life only cue, however, provides more puzzling results.
Low sophistication respondents who received the life only cue are more likely to be
pro-choice. More knowledgeable respondents who received this cue were unaffected
as compared to the control group. It is unclear why a one-sided cue for preserving
life would cause respondents to become more pro-choice, even if it is among low
sophisticated respondents.9 Finally, the neutral cues have no effect on abortion at-
titudes among the less sophisticated. Among the more sophisticated, however, it
makes them more likely to respond “always allow.” By looking at the control group
probabilities, and the data, we see that the higher sophistication respondents are
more pro-choice overall than the less knowledgeable people. It seems like the neutral
cues actually heighten the responses of the more knowledgeable respondents. Rather
than confusing people or leading them toward more middle responses, the neutral
cues have no effect on the less sophisticated, and actually lead to entrenchment in
their positions among the more sophisticated.
9The mean abortion rating for the sample does lean to the pro-choice side on abortion, but that
does not seem like enough to explain why low sophisticated people respond in the way that they
do.
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5.4 Abortion Attitudes Entrenched
I test several new measures for easy issues using abortion as the case study,
and find that abortion attitudes are relatively entrenched. Abortion exhibits lower
item non-response than most other issues, indicating that most people are at least
aware of abortion and have some attitudes on abortion. Abortion attitudes are also
resilient to the question wording and response options that are provided, again sup-
porting the idea that abortion attitudes are more crystallized. People do not get
confused or dissuaded from their opinions simply because they are asked about abor-
tion in a different way. The different frames mostly work to re-emphasize people’s
abortion attitudes, although there are some signs of framing effects.
I am concerned about using the term “easy” to describe abortion, however. In
terms of Carmines’ and Stimson’s original test for easy issues (that issue effect on
vote choice is not conditioned by level of political knowledge for easy issues), abortion
is not easy at all. Less sophisticated voters in the 2008 NES do not connect abortion
to their vote choice. In the end, although the theory of easy issues was created to save
issue voting from the realization that many Americans are politically unsophisticated
and therefore unlikely able to issue vote, people still are not connecting abortion to
the vote, even though other tests demonstrate abortion is an easy issue.
We see that abortion attitudes are more entrenched than attitudes on other is-
sues. Probably, “because the abortion debate draws on deep—and often unconscious—
beliefs and feelings about, and experiences with, such things as children, families,
sex, religion, and the basic natures of individuals—men and women—reactions to
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it are profound and powerful” (Luker 1985, 10). However, this is not enough for
an issue to translate into votes. Instead, the issue must also be salient and readily
identifiable with the parties or candidates.
Furthermore, I am concerned about deducing that framing may not be able
to change abortion attitudes based on this experiment. The abortion debate has
been fairly consistent in the U.S. for the last few decades, meaning that the frames
I constructed in a survey setting have little room to influence people’s abortion atti-
tudes. Framing in one survey question, on an issue that is so hot and widely-known,
may not be effective simply because it does not mimic real political discourse at all.
The consistent nature of this debate, however, should not lead us to believe that
no new frames could ever come about, or that there is no way to make this issue
more difficult for at least a substantial portion of the American public. “While the
militants on both sides would have us believe that the abortion debate is actually
very simple, such simplicity is both a necessity and a luxury for them. A necessity
because we must believe that the things about which we are passionate are either
clearly good or clearly bad. But because the belief in simplicity reduces any possi-
bility of dialogue or learning or coming to terms with real human dilemmas, it is a
luxury that neither the society nor the debate itself can afford” (Luker 1985, 13).
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5.5 Appendix Figures
Figure 5.4: (Appendix) The Impact of Abortion Attitudes (CONTROL) on Vote
Choice Across Sophistication in 2008 Elections
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Figure 5.5: (Appendix) The Impact of Abortion Attitudes (EXPERIMENTAL) on
Vote Choice Across Sophistication in 2008 Elections
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Figure 5.6: (Appendix) Easy/Hard Frames and Abortion Attitudes across Level of
Sophistication
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5.6 Appendix for Questions and Experimental Treat-
ments
5.6.1 2008 NES Abortion Questions:
Old Version There has been some discussion about abortion during recent
years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the
woman’s life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger
to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly
established.
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of
personal choice.
New Version [First,/Next,] do you FAVOR, OPPOSE, or NEITHER FAVOR
NOR OPPOSE abortion being LEGAL if:
• staying pregnant would hurt the woman’s health but is very unlikely to cause
her to die
• staying pregnant could cause the woman to die
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• the pregnancy was caused by sex the woman chose to have with a blood relative
• the pregnancy was caused by the woman being raped
• the fetus will be born with a serious birth defect
• having the child would be extremely difficult for the woman financially
• the child will not be the sex the woman wants it to be
Based on the respondent’s answer to each of these questions, s/he was then asked a
follow-up question about the strength of this opinion:
Do you favor that A GREAT DEAL, MODERATELY, or A LITTLE?
Do you oppose that A GREAT DEAL, MODERATELY, or A LITTLE?
Do you LEAN TOWARD FAVORING IT, LEAN TOWARD OPPOSING IT, or do
you NOT LEAN EITHER WAY?
5.6.2 2008 CCES Treatments:
Control Group: Some people think women should be allowed to have an abor-
tion. Other people think abortion should be banned. Which of the following opinions
comes closest to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought much about this?
Life Only Cue: Some people think abortion should be banned because they believe
that life begins at conception and abortion is murder. Which of the following opin-
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ions comes closest to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought much about this?
Rights Only Cue: Some people think women should be allowed to have an abor-
tion because they believe that government should not control women’s reproductive
rights. Which of the following opinions comes closest to your view on abortion, or
haven’t you thought much about this?
Neutral Cues: Some people think women should be allowed to have an abortion be-
cause they believe that government should not control women’s reproductive rights.
Other people think abortion should be banned because they believe that life begins
at conception and abortion is murder. Another group of people is somewhere in
between. They think abortion should be allowed in some circumstances (e.g. in the
cases of rape, incest, danger to the mother’s life, or severe complications with preg-
nancy) but there should be restrictions on abortions (e.g. none in the later stages of
pregnancy, parental consent for teenagers to have abortions). Which of the follow-
ing opinions comes closest to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought much
about this?
Many Democratic leaders think women should be allowed to have an abor-
tion because they believe that government should not control women’s reproductive
rights. Many Republican leaders think abortion should be banned because they
believe that life begins at conception and abortion is murder. Other leaders in both
parties are somewhere in between. They think abortion should be allowed in some
162
circumstances (e.g. in the cases of rape, incest, danger to the mother’s life, or se-
vere complications with pregnancy) but there should be restrictions on abortions
(e.g. none in the later stages of pregnancy, parental consent for teenagers to have
abortions). Which of the following opinions comes closest to your view on abortion,
or haven’t you thought much about this?
Republican leaders tend to think abortion should be banned, although many
support allowing abortion under certain circumstances (e.g. in the cases of rape,
incest, danger to the mother’s life, or severe complications with pregnancy) and
only in the early stages of pregnancy and only with parental consent in the case of
a teenage pregnancy. Democratic leaders tend to think women should be allowed to
have an abortion, but many support bans on abortion in the later stages of preg-
nancy, and many others support parental consent requirements for teenagers to have
abortions. Which of the following opinions comes closest to your view on abortion,
or haven’t you thought much about this?
Party Cues: Many Democratic leaders think women should be allowed to have an
abortion. Many Republican leaders think abortion should be banned. Which of the
following opinions comes closest to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought
much about this?
Many Democratic leaders think women should be allowed to have an abortion be-
cause they believe that government should not control women’s reproductive rights.
Many Republican leaders think abortion should be banned because they believe that
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life begins at conception and abortion is murder. Which of the following opinions
comes closest to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought much about this?
Policy Cue: Some people think women should be allowed to have an abortion be-
cause they believe that government should not control womens reproductive rights.
Other people think abortion should be banned because they believe that life begins
at conception and abortion is murder. Which of the following opinions comes closest
to your view on abortion, or haven’t you thought much about this?
5.6.3 2008 CCES Response Options for all Treatments:
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the
woman’s life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or dan-
ger to the woman’s life, but only in certain circumstances (e.g. if there are
other severe complications with a pregnancy, only in the first three months of
pregnancy, only if teenagers have gotten their parents’ consent).
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of
personal choice.




6.1 Reconsidering “Easy” Issues
When I originally set out down this path, I sought to understand why certain
issues are easy, and what the source of that easiness could be. Are some issues
inherently easy and others intrinsically hard? Are easy issues rendered easy through
the use of frames? Are all issues subject to the same level of manipulation? In the
end, I cannot completely answer these questions. The concept of easy issues proved
too elusive. Defining easy issues is like grasping a handful of sand—it disappears
through my fingers every time, and the harder I squeeze and try to hold on, the
faster it slips away.
Throughout my dissertation, I explored the theory of “easy” and “hard” issues
as established by Carmines and Stimson and adopted by a number of subsequent
political science scholars. Chapter 2 showed that issue voting is a tricky test for easy
and hard issues because the economy and foreign policy issues are often the ones
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with the strongest connection to the vote, despite their technical content. Chapter
3 explored what issues Americans think the most about and form attitudes about.
The analysis revealed that Americans do have more difficulty giving valid responses
to questions about the economy and foreign policy, but at the same time, these
issues are also seen as the most important. As a result of the findings from these
two chapters, I argue that economic and foreign policy issues are not necessarily
“hard” for people. Instead, these issues are primarily seen as “performance” issues,
meaning that people do not need to grapple with the complexities of these issues
because they simply want to know if the U.S. is winning or losing. Beyond this,
the ability of elites to frame on these issues is limited. Little politicking occurs on
these issues not because they are so technical and have no hope of being framed
in a public-friendly way, but because politicians are unable to generate “winning”
frames when they are losing on the issue.
Some issues, like abortion, gay marriage, and race-related issues, do seem to
be “easy,” though. Although these issues are not the most important issues, people
still seem to have more readily available and solidified attitudes on these issues. In
the second part of my dissertation, I explored the potential source of issue easiness—
whether issues are inherently easy and hard or whether they are framed to be so.
In chapter 4 I took several “hard” issues, such as limiting foreign imports, and
attempted to make the issues easier or harder using a group-based, emotional frame
and a technical, policy-based frame. The emotional cue did make imports a little
easier for respondents, and more people were able to give an opinion when offered
the emotional cue as compared to the technical cue. However, overall, the empirical
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evidence was mixed. The frames did not consistently work to make technical issues
“easy” for respondents.
In chapter 5, I made abortion, a commonly accepted “easy” issue, the focus
of my framing experiments. In this case, I tried to harden the issue by providing
one-sided and neutral/ambivelant cues. One of the arguments for issue easiness is
that clear partisan stances lead to an easier understanding of issues. The goal was
to dissuade people from their abortion attitudes by reminding them that a number
of people in both parties are unsure what they think about the issue. Again, the
results were mixed. Framing did not have the desired effect on respondents’ abortion
attitudes. Most people were resilient to the frames.
I do not think this indicates, however, that framing is unimportant in creating
“easy” issues. I think there are several possible reasons my experiments did not
work out as hoped. In the case of abortion, attitudes are entrenched. There have
been essentially no new framing or political developments with regard to this issue
in two decades. Therefore, by now essentially everyone has 1) had time to develop
an attitude on this issue, 2) many people know how the parties stand in regards to
this issue. Therefore, attempts to remind people that others are uncertain on this
issue does not work. In hindsight, it does not seem plausible that so many people
are confused on this issue given its political history. In the case of the hard issues,
these issues were picked because there were few/no existing frames for these issues,
meaning that the frames might be able to influence opinion more easily. However, I
think these issues proved too esoteric for most respondents and even with emotional
cues they could not recall an attitude (or make up an attitude) about these issues.
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The cues were not one-sided, so even the emotional cue required them to process a
good bit of information about a non-salient issue.
Furthermore, I think framing in a laboratory setting or on a survey is unlikely
to be effective to really see how frames work to make some issues easy and others
hard in politics. These sorts of frames and tests do not mimic real politics closely
enough to be highly effective. Either people will already know a lot about the issue
(especially CCES respondents since they are more politically knowledgeable than
the average American and have access to the internet while taking the surveys), or
they will know absolutely nothing about the issue because it is not salient. Either
way, though, critical components of the political process are missing. There are no
focusing events, public political cues from the media and political elites, counter-
arguments from the opposition, etc. that are all essential elements of an issue
becoming easy.
6.2 Returning to the Normative Implications
At the outset of this project in chapter 1, there is a clear recognition of the
normative implications of this project. As I discussed, many scholars have gone in
search of explanations for Americans’ political behavior given their limited political
interest and awareness. Understanding what voters are thinking about when electing
a president and other public officials, and the state of public opinion on a variety
of important issues, is critical to understanding our world. It is no wonder, then,
so many scholars have devoted great attention to understanding these processes.
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Carmines and Stimson fall into this category as well; they were writing in response
to critiques that Americans are too politically unknowledgeable to meaningfully
participate in politics. The theory of “easy” and “hard” issues is full of normative
implications for the way that we think about our political institutions and public
policy outcomes. This theory shapes our understanding of how people participate
in government and touches on our understanding of what it means to be a “good”
citizen.
Under classical democratic theory citizens should make careful, reasoned de-
cisions as a result of political discourse, but we are confronted with discouraging
findings about the low sophistication of voters. Carmines and Stimson provide the
theory of easy issues as a way to save citizens from critiques that they are too
unaware to make political choices. Certainly, less sophisticated citizens cannot un-
derstand complex, technical issues and use them to vote. However, all citizens can
vote on “easy” issues that are emotional, gut-level, and deal with policy ends. My
findings are not as optimistic about the potential for easy issue voting as Carmines
and Stimson. I do not think there is a special class of inherently easy issues that
voters can summon up and use to vote. The political context has far too much
impact on what issues are salient and clearly associated with a vote choice (the
candidate or party associated with a particular stance on an issue). Yet, that is not
to say that I think hopes for meaningful citizen participation are dead.
People still participate through the use of issues that are framed to be easy,
and performance issues. Although “easy” framing does not satisfy some critics of
the American public because they see framing as manipulation of the issues by elites,
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with a theoretically infinite number of possible political issues, the political context
is critical for people to understand politics. I, therefore, do not condemn citizens
who understand issues through the use of frames because I see it as inevitable. I
also think that performance issues do allow people to issue vote and lead policy
outcomes. The public does not shape specific policy prescriptions necessarily, but
can shape the policy outcomes. For the system to work, “Politicians need not discern
the precise policy preferences of their constituents . . . large majorities prefer peace
to war, high employment and stable prices to unemployment and inflation, social
harmony to social tension, energy self-sufficiency to dependence on imported oil,
and so forth” (Fiorina 1981, 11).
6.3 Future Research
Although the empirical evidence presented is not always consistent, I have
thought extensively about this concept and do believe that I have several insights.
I have been unable to empirically demonstrate most of them with the data that I
have available, but, theoretically this is what I have learned about easy and hard
issues through the course of my dissertation:
1. I expect that “easy” issues are primarily easy because of framing and the
political environment. As the famous William Jennings Bryan speech at the
introduction of my dissertation demonstrates, even something as technical and
complex as the rate that silver should be coined to gold can be made a visceral
issue with the right frames (see number 6 for an exception to this rule).
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2. Frames come about because of strategic politicians who are trying to win.
3. Frames, although critical for the development of “easy” issues, are not bound-
less; they are constrained by: a) focusing events, b) previously existing party
frames, c) public opinion. It is yet unclear to me what the role is—if there is
one—of the issue’s specific characteristics (i.e. can any issue be framed to be
about anything? Just as an example, could welfare spending be framed to be
about terrorism? Or, is there something inherent about welfare that prevents
it from being framed about terrorism?)
4. Foreign policy and economic issues are not necessarily “hard” issues, but they
are in a different class of issues. They are primarily “performance” issues
that are understood in terms of success and failure. They matter the most
in politics, which is implausible if they really are “hard” issues, and they are
largely outside of the control of politicians because there are obvious winners
and losers most of the time.
5. I believe that the U.S. (and possibly other countries as well) have a hierarchy of
issues much like animals’ hierarchy of needs. The economy and foreign policy
are at the top of this list because they deal with self-preservation. This is
followed by more indirect threats to self-preservation—attacks on identity from
“others”. Attacks on identity are not necessarily threats of physical harm but
psychological or emotional harm some people feel. Hence why race/ethnicity
(and in more modern times, immigration) is such an important issue in the
U.S.
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6. Therefore, if there is any such thing as an “easy” issue, it must deal with
identity. I acknowledge, though, the problem is that theoretically, anything
can be made about identity. While in reality there are probably limits on what
issues can be framed in terms of identity, theoretically speaking, anything
could be about identity.
7. The remaining issues, like morality, social welfare, etc., will primarily be salient
when issues at the top of the hierarchy are more or less silent. These issues
could come about at other times due to framing and focusing events, but are
unlikely to matter if other issues (like the economy) are not working out well.
Although I have no empirical evidence yet for a number of these claims, I hope that
my post-dissertation research will shed light on a number of these topics.
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